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This workshop is a partnership between NOAA’s Gulf of Mexico Disaster 
Response Center and the Disaster Preparedness Program with the Coastal 
Response Research Center.  
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I. Acronyms 
AST Atlantic Standard Time 
(B)EOC (Business) Emergency Operation Center 
CARICOOS Caribbean Regional Association for Coastal Ocean Observing 
CERT Community Emergency Response Team 
COA Course of Action 
CRRC Coastal Response Research Center 
CTWP NOAA NWS Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program 
CWA Cyclone Watch Area 
DNER/DRNA Puerto Rico Department of Natural and Environmental Resources (Spanish=DRNA) 
DOI U.S. Department of the Interior 
DPP Disaster Preparedness Program 
DRC NOAA’s Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response Center 
EAS Emergency Alert System 
EMS Emergency Management System 
EOC Emergency Operations Center 
ESF Emergency Support Function 
EWW Extreme Wind Warning 
FEMA U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GOM Gulf of Mexico 
GSA U.S. General Services Administration 
HHW Household Hazardous Waste 
HLS Hurricane Local Statement 
IDSS Impact-Based Decision Support Services 
IOOS Integrated Ocean Observing System 
IOC Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO 
IPaC U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Information for Planning and Consultation 
ISER-Caribe Institute for Socio-Ecological Research, Inc. – Caribbean 
JFO Joint Field Office 
MEOW Maximum Envelop of Water 
MER U.S. Coast Guard Marine Environmental Response 
MOM Maximum of MEOW 
NARA The National Archives and Records Administration 
NCR Natural and Cultural Resources 
NEA National Endowment for the Arts 
NEH National Endowment for the Humanities 
NESDIS National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Services 
NFWF National Fish and Wildlife Foundation 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NHC National Hurricane Center 
NMEAD Negociado para el Manejo de Emergencias y Administracion de Desastres (The Bureau 
of Emergency Management and Disaster Management of the Department of Public 
Safety) 
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOS National Ocean Service 
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NRPT NOAA Regional Preparedness Training 
NRT National Response Team 
NWS NOAA National Weather Service 
OEM Office of Emergency Management 
OFA Other Federal Agencies 
OR&R NOAA Office of Response & Restoration 
PA System Public Announcement System 
PPAPG FEMA Public Assistance Program Policy Guide 
PSMA Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments 
PRASA Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority 
PREMA Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency 
PRSN Puerto Rico Seismic Network 
PTWC Pacific Tsunami Warning Center 
RRF Resource Request Form 
RSF Recovery Support Function 
RSS Rich Site Summary and Really Simple Syndication (respectively) is a type of web feed 
which allows users and applications to access updates to online content in a 
standardized, computer-readable format. 
SJFO San Juan Forecast Office 
TCV Tropical Cyclone Watch/Warning 
TWC Tsunami Warning Center 
TWFP Tsunami Warning Focal Point 
UPR University of Puerto Rico 
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
USEPA/EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
USCG U.S. Coast Guard 
USVI U.S. Virgin Islands 
VHF Very High Frequency  
VITEMA Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency 
VTEC Valid Time Event Code  
WEA Wireless emergency alerts 
WFO Weather Forecast Office 
WWTP Wastewater treatment plant 
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This workshop and report were supported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 
Disaster Preparedness Program (DPP) and the University of New Hampshire’s Coastal Response 
Research Center (CRRC).  The content for the workshop was developed in cooperation with NOAA’s Gulf 
of Mexico Disaster Response Center and the following Organizing Committee members: 
• Nancy Kinner, Coastal Response Research Center, University of New Hampshire 
• Charlie Henry, NOAA Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response Center 
• Christa von Hillebrandt-Andrade, NOAA National Weather Service, Caribbean Tsunami Warning 
Program 
• Roberto Garcia-Hiraldo, NOAA National Weather Service, San Juan Weather Forecast Office 
• Sean Griffin, NOAA Restoration Center 
• Jennifer Koss, NOAA Coral Reef Conservation Program 
• Lisamarie “Lee” Carrubba, NOAA Fisheries, Office of Protected Resources 
This workshop was facilitated by Dr. Nancy Kinner from the Coastal Response Research Center (CRRC; 
www.crrc.unh.edu).  CRRC is known for its independence and excellence in areas pertaining to 
environmental engineering, marine science and ocean engineering as they relate to oil spills.  The Center 
has widespread experience working with disaster preparedness and hazardous spill-related issues.  CRRC 
has conducted 60+ workshops that bring together practitioners, researchers, and scientists of diverse 
backgrounds (e.g., industry, academia, government, NGOs).  
We would like to thank each of the presenters for their participation in the workshop:  
• Carmen R. Guerrero-Perez, Director of the Caribbean Environmental Protection Division 
(Lessons Learned following Hurricane Maria) 
• Ernesto Rodríguez, NOAA National Weather Service, San Juan Weather Forecast Office (Learning 
from the Past, Improvement for the Future) 
• CAPT Ricardo Alonso, USCG MER (Mission Response)  
• Charlie Henry, NOAA Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response Center (Introduction to NOAA’s Disaster 
Preparedness Program) 
• Jennifer Koss, NOAA Coral Reef Program (NOAA Caribbean Overview, Mission Response) 
• Jose Marchand, FEMA Capacity Building Sector (FEMA Capacity Building Sector) 
• Debra Payton, U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) (Responsibilities, Efforts and Lessons 
Learned for Natural and Cultural Resources (NCR) Recovery Support Function (RSF)) 
• Carlos Huertas-Hernandez, EPA, On-Scene Coordinator (EPA Response Perspective) 
• Ernesto Diaz, DNER (Lessons Learned) 
• Carlos Irigoyen Gonzalez, Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA) (Lessons 
Learned & Risk Communication) 
• Christa von Hillebrandt-Andrade, NOAA Tsunami Center (Tsunami Mission, Products and 
Protocols) 
• Ernesto Morales, NOAA National Weather Service, San Juan Weather Forecast Office (NWS 
Weather and Forecast Products for Decision-Makers) 
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• Mirelsa Modestti Gonzalez, Sagrado Corazón University (Social Media Tips) 
Thank you to Christa von Hillebrandt-Andrade, Carolina Hincapié, Ernesto Rodríguez and Odalys 
Martinez for organizing and facilitating the tsunami and hurricane preparedness training that took place 
on the final day of the workshop. 
A special thanks to (1) the Breakout Group Leads: CAPT Ricardo Alonso, Debra Payton, Charles Grisafi, 
Charlie Henry and Jennifer Koss; and (2) Kathy Mandsager, Jesse Ross, Zak Mandsager and Melissa 
Gloekler for their note-taking during the workshop. 
We greatly appreciate the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Caribbean Environmental 
Protection Division in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico for their hospitality and providing an excellent meeting 
venue. 
III. Introduction 
On April 23-25th, 2019, CRRC and DPP co-sponsored a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT) Workshop at the USEPA facility in Guaynabo, Puerto 
Rico.  The workshop, titled “Learning from the Past and Moving Forward: Response* Challenges from 
Severe Weather or Tsunamis to Shared Trust Resources and Mission Responsibilities”, focused on 
preparedness, planning and improving response to an extreme weather event or natural disaster.   
*For the purpose of this workshop, the term “response” includes a continuum from emergency 
response activities through recovery activities. 
Forty-five participants (Appendix B) represented federal, commonwealth and local agencies, academia, 
and industry.  
This was the fourth workshop in a series of NRPT events, the goal of this workshop is to provide focused 
discussion regarding lessons learned from hurricane and natural disaster response for specific regions.  
NRPT workshops are conducted to improve preparedness and build a common understanding of how 
disasters can be addressed when they threaten personnel, infrastructure or natural resources.  This 
program uses NOAA resources to address localized problems and concerns with respect to emergency 
preparedness and planning.  The focus of the workshop was improving preparedness- through 
communication, logistics and building relationships/planning season for the Caribbean region (e.g., 
Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands) following the 2017 hurricane.   
Workshop Objectives:  
1. Improve knowledge and skills to enhance risk communications before and after a damaging or 
disastrous tropical hurricane (cyclone) or tsunami event.  
2. Apply lessons learned to “disaster readiness” for safety of staff and families as well as shared 
trust resources. 
3. Enhance effective mission response and recovery activities. 
4. Build resilient local coastal communities on the islands through preparedness planning to: (a) 
gain knowledge, (b) enhance cross-agency and cross-regional coordination, and (c) foster 
response/recovery planning and informed actions.  
 
NRPT: Learning from the Past and Moving Forward: 
Response Challenges from Severe Weather or Tsunamis to Shared Trust Resources & Mission Responsibilities 




1. With adequate information and communicated knowledge, the public and response community 
will make informed decisions relative to personal protection and safety. 
2. With adequate information and effective communications, responders and natural resource 
managers are prepared for and respond effectively to mitigate disaster impacts.  
The workshop consisted of plenary presentations, three breakout group discussions and two table-top 
exercises.  The first two days included plenary presentations from local and federal emergency 
responders outlining organization missions and responsibilities, lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane 
season and improvements for the future.  A summary of the presentations can be found Section III 
“Plenary Presentations”, slides are located in Appendix C. 
Participants were split into four breakout groups (Groups A-D), and remained in these same groups for 
all three of the breakout group discussions.  Breakout groups were tasked with: (1) identifying 
lessons/practices/skills learned from the plenary presentations, (2) highlighting actions to improve/put 
into practice the previously identified “lessons learned”, and (3) recommend actions for 
implementation. The third day consisted of two table top exercises, the first was on tsunami 
preparedness and planning, and the second focused on hurricane emergency response planning and 
preparedness.  
The agenda for the workshop can be found in Appendix A. 
IV. Plenary Presentations 
Day 1 – April 23, 2019  
Carmen Guerrero-Perez, Director of EPA Region 2’s Caribbean Environmental Protection Division, 
discussed lessons learned with respect to terrestrial and marine chemical spills and response following 
Hurricane Maria.  Director Guerrero-Perez drew specific attention to the quantity of disaster debris 
generated and removed (e.g., approximately 12 million cubic yards of debris, 52% construction debris 
and 44% vegetative debris) and the management of household hazardous wastes (HHW) (e.g., 322,148 
HHW containers in Puerto Rico, 145,575 HHW containers in USVI).  Following the hurricane, 22 of 51 
wastewater treatment plants (WWTP) in Puerto Rico were out of service, three WWTPs completely 
flooded, and 222 of 714 pump stations were out of service.   Out of service facilities and infrastructure 
resulted in sewage overflows into surface and coastal waters.  Coastal flooding was also exacerbated 
due to inoperable stormwater management systems.  In order to protect public health and determine 
environmental conditions post hurricane, the restoration of the water- and air-quality monitoring 
networks were a priority in the emergency response.  
There were many pre-existing conditions that were exacerbated by the hurricanes.  Examples of these 
include: the fiscal situation, deterioration of infrastructure, lack of maintenance and resources, history 
of non-compliance, threats from extreme weather and natural disaster events (e.g., hurricanes, drought, 
precipitation, sea level rise, salinity intrusion to aquifers). 
Director Guerrero-Perez discussed methods to move forward and improve disaster preparedness and 
planning.  The first recommendation emphasized the need for continuous improvement because “being 
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prepared is not a one-time effort”.  In order to do this, multisector and multidisciplinary engagement is 
needed to clarify roles during a response and improve emergency preparedness.  Stakeholders for a 
multisector approach include local government (e.g., DNER, PREMA), Federal government (e.g., NOAA, 
DOI, USCG, FEMA, USACE, USEPA), academia (e.g., UPR, Sea Grant, CARICOOS, PR Seismic Network, 
etc.), NGOs (e.g., Para la Naturaleza, Foundation for Puerto Rico, ISER-Caribe) and the private 
sector.  The second take-away message was focusing on emergency management plans, specifically on 
pre-selected locations for temporary staging areas, pre-agreements with municipalities, waivers and 
permit pre-approvals with local and federal agencies.  Third, was leveraging resources allocated by the 
federal government and disaster recovery plans to avoid duplication of efforts. Finally, she 
recommended focusing on risk communications before, during and after an extreme weather 
event/natural disaster to minimize public health impacts and coordinate a successful emergency 
response.  
Ernesto Rodríguez, NOAA NWS, introduced the mission and vision outlined by the NWS.  The mission is 
to provide weather, water and climate data forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and 
property and the enhancement of the national economy.  Preparation for the hurricane season is a year-
long event, which requires building trust between emergency response organizations to minimize stress 
during actual events.  NWS employees meet with decision makers to work through various tabletop 
exercises, full-scale exercises and outreach activities.  There are pre-event coordination meetings 
conducted with island commonwealth, local governments and federal agencies that include briefings 
and information sharing sessions.  Core partners (e.g., PREMA) use information provided by NWS to 
make critical decisions; exercises and briefings provide a venue for NWS to teach partners how to 
correctly interpret information, weather maps and forecasts.   
NWS also coordinates internal meetings to update graphic outputs to be more user friendly, answer 
questions asked by decision makers, and discuss the best ways to tailor information with respect to 
region.  Internal coordination meetings allow NWS to be on the same page in case one office needs to 
cover for another other during an emergency event.  This occurred in 2017; the Miami office was in 
charge of day-to-day work when the San Juan office was supporting the Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) following Hurricane Maria.  
The highlighted lessons learned were: (1) the need for back-up communication in the event of a disaster, 
(2) the realization that not all tools will be available following a catastrophic event, and (3) contingency 
planning including multiple back-up NWS offices outside of threat zone to act as support offices.  
CAPT Ricardo Alonso, USCG Marine Environmental Response (MER), focused on the USCG’s mission 
response and the role of the Coast Guard during a response operation.  The National Response Team 
(NRT) is activated in the event of oil or hazardous substances discharge, transect national boundaries, or 
threatens public health, property, or natural resources. CAPT Alonso stressed the importance of good 
communication and understanding the framework for how the federal government operates in an 
emergency.  He also recommended that all response organizations read the overarching regulatory 
authority (e.g., 40 CFR 300 National Contingency Plan), and know the functions (e.g., roles and 
responsibilities) of each organization and personnel when responding to a disaster.  Although 
preparedness is a slow and tedious process, it is the most important piece when saving lives.  
Preparedness planning needs to be done both internally (e.g., local, district, families) as well as 
externally (e.g., area contingency plans).  The local and regional scale should include tabletop and 
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hands-on exercises (e.g., pre-staging equipment) to identify weaknesses and gaps prior to a disaster.  
Exercises should also encourage interaction between stakeholders, opening early lines of 
communication and introducing critical players. 
CAPT Alonso documented five key points: (1) USEPA and USCG coordinate and direct the response, 
USEPA for inland areas and USCG for the coastal zone; (2) other federal agencies with appropriate 
jurisdiction and expertise support the lead agency; (3) activities are done in partnership with 
state/commonwealth and local officials; (4) industry is responsible for being prepared for, responding 
to, and paying for cleanup and damages from pollution incidents when they are designated the primary 
responsible party; (5) the NRT uses the National Incident Management System/Incident Command 
System to bring these parties together to manage response actions.  
Throughout the presentation, four response and recovery challenges were identified: (1) interagency 
coordination, (2) the ability to rapidly set-up communications for interagency coordination, (3) response 
dependent upon logistics, surge forces and equipment, and (4) infrastructure critical for survivors and 
responders.  
Major lessons learned following recent hurricane responses include: (1) issues identified with respect to 
USCG flood response assets (e.g., equipment, communication); (2) satellite phones capable of placing 
and receiving calls should be used during response operations; and (3) additional internet technology 
support should be on-hand during a disaster.  A more general summary of lessons learned that can be 
applied to an array of agencies consist of: (1) use of resources to enhance alignment with partner 
agencies’ goals; (2) use of Flood Punt Teams to conduct urban Search and Rescue; (3) Emergency 
Support Function (ESF)-10 and mission assignment training; (4) training of unmanned aircraft system; (5) 
plan for and execute exercises spanning across multiple districts; (6) ensure personnel support teams 
are adequately staffed to manage call volume for accountability of CG members an family; and, (7) 
continually engage with external agencies pre and post hurricane season, as well as leverage 
relationships during event.  
Jennifer Koss, Director of the Coral Reef Conservation Program at NOAA, gave an overview of NOAA’s 
presence in the Caribbean, including NOAA’s role as a science based organization to provide the best 
available science when assisting decision makers.  Additionally, NOAA NWS/NOS keeps citizens aware of 
any climate and weather related changes, help with fisheries management, and provide support to 
fisheries commerce. With respect to response organizations, NOAA maintains the NWS Caribbean 
Tsunami Warning Program (CTWP), the National Hurricane Center (NHC), the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS), National Ocean Service (NOS), the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS), Sea 
Grant and the National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service (NESDIS). 
Following Hurricane Maria, there were mission assignments through FEMA to conduct coral 
restoration.  FEMA and NOAA/NFWF reattached over 17,000 corals at 70+ field sites and surveyed over 
400,000 m2 of reefs.  This was the first ever mission assignment FEMA authorized for coral assessment 
and triage work; it was recognized by FEMA that coral reefs are the first line of defense to reduce storm 
related impacts (e.g., storm surge, wave energy).  
Charlie Henry, NOAA OR&R DPP, noted all of the line offices in NOAA have a role in disaster 
response.  The FEMA pre-scripted mission assignments assigned to NOAA’s National Ocean Service 
(NOS) include: coastal science support coordinator, geodetic surveys, aerial imagery/LIDAR, 
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hydrographic surveys, scientific support for oil and chemical spills, and marine debris assessment.  If 
there are other needs or requests by FEMA for NOAA support (e.g., recovery functions) additional and 
new missions can be assigned.  NOAA OR&R’s mission is to provide world-class science and information-
based solutions to protect and restore the nation’s resources and their uses from coastal environmental 
hazards.  The Disaster Response Center (DRC) was established as a hub in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) 
which serves as the center for emergency preparedness and response in the case of a 
disaster/environmental hazard. 
Jose R. Marchand-Parnell, FEMA Acting Deputy Director for the Capacity Building Sector of FEMA 
noted the main challenge when responding to Hurricane Maria was the lack of preparation, better 
preparedness supports a faster recovery.  The FEMA mission was to provide essential support, guidance 
and tools to the whole community including federal, commonwealth, municipal, private sectors and 
NGO partners.  To build upon, restore and strengthen their capability and capacity as entities and 
individuals, to be prepared and able to perform their essential functions effectively, efficiently, and 
sustainably in response and recovery efforts.  The core partners that FEMA worked with during recovery 
included the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA), Puerto Rico Planning Board and 78 
local Emergency Management Offices.  The programs/units that fall under recovery include: community 
resiliency/preparedness, continuity of operations, training and exercise, mass care, and others.   
Mr. Marchand outlined major innovations/lessons learned: (1) The need for assessing current 
capabilities of local communities to determine their level of preparedness when responding to a 
disaster.  If preparedness seems to be inadequate, then teaching communities and providing technical 
advice to improve the baseline knowledge level is essential.  Outreach programs include, the FEMA 
lifelines situational reporting integration which was developed to ensure response is coordinated in the 
same manner regardless of language, background to ensure that all communities are on the same page 
when preparing for an event.  The initiation of the Youth Preparedness Council provides in-school 
learning opportunities to practice preparedness, and spreads knowledge through community outreach 
and projects.  Another outreach program is through the Core Advisory Groups; these are made up of 
community volunteers and different NGO’s throughout the island, working with various planning tools, 
whose goal is assessing and identifying population needs that should be accounted for during a 
response, and to ensure disability integration throughout all emergency planning phases. (2) The 
establishment of the Business Emergency Operation Center (BEOC) that involves private businesses in 
planning and response stages.  In the past, engagement with private businesses was limited, but it is a 
valuable asset during a response.  (3) The need to work with academia to engage local colleges and 
universities in developing an emergency management curriculum to encourage students to think of it as 
a career path.  (4) The need to minimize the high employee turnover rate within local organizations and 
improve the flow of information for new employees.  In order to keep people prepared, continuous 
training of employees is necessary.   
Debra Payton, Department of Interior (DOI) noted that FEMA operates as a coordinating agency 
following five frameworks associated with disasters: prevention, protection, mitigation, response and 
recovery. Following Hurricane Maria, DOI is supporting FEMA as the Natural and Cultural Resource 
coordinator under the Recovery framework. DOI’s mission is to protect natural and cultural resources 
and historic properties through appropriate actions to preserve and restore them consistent with post-
disaster community priorities and best practices, and in compliance with applicable environmental and 
historic laws and orders. This objective is delivered through the Natural and Cultural Resources (NCR) 
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Recovery Support Function (RSF) which encompasses primary agencies such as DOI, NOAA, USEPA and 
FEMA and several supporting agencies. There are many classifications of cultural resources, including 
archeological sites, buildings and structures, landscapes, burial sites, objects/collections/records. 
Additionally, DOI focuses on protection and restoration of natural resources, which includes wildlife, 
vegetation, land, water (e.g., salt and fresh, surface and groundwater, drinking, irrigation), and 
recreational sites.  
The effort to restore damaged natural and cultural sites begins through a series of assessments. 
Following Hurricane Maria, DOI conducted over 40 different types of assessments. It was imperative to 
do the work upfront because it is hard to capture the devastation once restoration begins. The initial 
assessments resulted in courses of action (COAs); there are a total of 276 COA’s that were in the 
governor’s report. NCR “owns” 22 of those COAs. COA development was supported by many agencies 
and partners (e.g., DOI, NOAA, EPA, USDA, NEA, GSA, NEH, NARA, the Commonwealth, UPR and NGOs), 
and was conducted by using Solutions Based Teams. Solution Based Teams can identify solutions to 
COAs, provide advice/recommendations and expertise to the Commonwealth, provide the 
Commonwealth assistance in prioritizing projects, determine/suggest appropriate sources of funding, 
and provide technical assistance in scoping projects. Most resources under NCR do not qualify for FEMA 
funds. Therefore, the next step after assembling the COAs is to identify potential funding sources and/or 
partnerships to move projects forward (e.g., public/private partnerships, grants, Federal Agency 
supplemental funds, NGOs, philanthropic sources).  
The lessons learned from the perspective of DOI included: (1) the scope of potentially impacted 
resources is difficult to determine initially and damages may not be known upfront; 18 months later 
there are still a few assessments that are underway, (2) in tropical areas, downed wood is not 
necessarily debris, (3) application of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program Policy Guide (PAPPG) for non-
traditional natural features is complex, and (4) it is important to be bold when conducting initial 
assessments. 
Carlos Huertas-Hernández, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), noted that during a declared 
disaster response, the USEPA operates under “Emergency Support Function #10: Oil and Hazardous 
Materials Response” of the National Response Framework. Under this function, USEPA provides 
personnel to assist FEMA and other EOCs in response operations.  Additionally, USEPA is responsible for 
removal, cleanup and disposal of oil and hazardous materials.  This includes collection and disposal of 
household hazardous waste (HHW) and monitoring immediate threats to public and environmental 
health and safety in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  Following Hurricane Maria, USEPA was also 
tasked with drinking water monitoring in the U.S. Virgin Islands, repairing ambient air monitoring 
stations in Puerto Rico and providing emergency power to non-PRASA systems in Puerto Rico. 
Coordination and execution of all necessary assessments, evaluations, sampling and analytical 
services/support was performed by USEPA employees to ensure the safety and quality of drinking water 
and wastewater systems in Puerto Rico. 
These tasks brought to light a number of challenges/lessons learned, which included: (1) 
difficulties/delays in transporting personnel and equipment into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
via flights and barges, (2) many responders were not Spanish speakers, but local translators 
were  (success story), (3) USEPA coordinated the segregation, transportation and disposal of all oil and 
hazardous substances collected under ESF#10 by both USEPA and USCG, (4) equipment was held up in 
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U.S. Virgin Island ports due to demands for tax payments, (5) equipment was held in the continental U.S. 
/hard to get on a barge because of low priority compared to food or water (i.e., pre-staged equipment), 
(6) administrative hurdles from FEMA in efforts to make non-PRASA systems eligible for temporary 
repairs or emergency power, (7) all hazardous materials needed to be  transported to the mainland, (8) 
contracting issues associated with the procurement of ambient air monitoring equipment for Puerto 
Rico, (9) use of DOI’s IPaC system to conduct Endangered Species Act Section 7 consultations for HHW 
staging areas worked well, and (10) central drop off locations for community members to bring HHW 
was the most efficient collection system. 
Ernesto Diaz, DNER/DRNA, started the presentation stating that communities were not prepared for a 
category 4 or 5 hurricane.  For example, the power grid failed, communications went down and fuel 
(e.g., gasoline) was not being distributed post-disaster.  In the midst of the disaster, DNER submitted a 
request for Mission Assignments under FEMA ESF 10 to work with the USCG, USACE, and NOAA.  DNER 
submitted a resource request form (RRF) for sunken vessel removal in coordination with USCG, as well 
as an RRF for coastal, nearshore and beach debris removal with the USACE.  The USCG came prepared to 
respond and had a clear path towards response which helped to guide DNER protocols.  Through this 
process, DNER began developing and fine tuning their own protocol for sunken vessel removal and 
recommended that the protocol be further refined.  Due to legal issues, marine debris removal halted 
progress and a lot of the work has not been completed.  The process was divided into two phases: the 
first was manual removal of debris the second is debris removal using heavy equipment.  Phase two has 
not been started.  Additionally, DNER requested FEMA (i.e., NCR) to conduct damage assessments and 
support progress when developing COAs for coral reefs, seagrasses, beaches, dunes and wetlands.  In 
order for coral reefs to be eligible as a critical maintained natural infrastructure’ and receive funding, 
FEMA required documentation through a scientific review, regarding how reefs protect coastlines.  In 
cooperation with CariCOOS, they were able to show that waves were attenuated by reefs and that 
damage costs were minimized and not incurred by FEMA because reefs were able to protect shorelines.  
Now, insurance has recognized that reefs are an important coastal protection and worth rebuilding and 
maintaining.  
Due to short staffing and limited resources the DNER was divided, some employees conducted damage 
assessments, while others stayed at the JFO to work on reports.  A major lesson learned was that some 
communities did not know what an RRF was, how to submit it and check that it was filed properly.  If an 
RRF was not submitted, then FEMA was unable to address the issue.  It is recommended that training be 
conducted at the municipality level to inform workers what an RRF is and how to properly file one.   
In order to be prepared for future natural disasters and storm events, DNER recommends that detailed 
maps of built up areas and natural assets be compiled ahead of time.  This will help to set a baseline and 
streamline the damage assessment process.  Through this rebuilding process, it has been highlighted 
that infrastructure must be built back stronger than before, and retrofitting of homes needs to provide 
resiliency for future events.  Additionally, corals and natural infrastructure must be maintained and 
restored to protect coastal communities, critical infrastructure and biodiversity. 
Carlos Irigoyen Gonzalez, Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA), noted that the 
mission of PREMA is to coordinate all resources from the government and private sector, in order to 
provide the fastest and most effective services before, during and after emergency situations to ensure 
the protection of life and property of citizens. Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rican municipalities, 
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and many were designated eligible for the Public Assistance and Individual Assistance programs.  70,000 
homes lost their roofs and there was a total collapse of essential services such as communications and 
warehouse space.  The Emergency Operational Plans of the government agencies and municipalities 
were scaled up from lower category hurricane to address damages from a category 4 or 5 hurricane such 
as Hurricane Maria.  
As a result, uniform systems of plans, training and exercises have been developed. The 
state/commonwealth and the municipal emergency management structure is strengthened, and 
changes have been made to the supply distribution plan, so as to avoid running out of warehouse space 
and commodities, and to ensure citizens receive important necessities quickly and in an orderly fashion. 
Working on the installation of satellite communication systems is a major priority; radios of 100 watts 
are being installed in hospitals, police stations, fire stations, EMS Central Communications Center, and 
OEM offices around the island.  These radios have the ability to work without the need for 
repeaters.  An alliance with the private sector has been initiated, which is the first time private 
companies have been included in the EOC.  Sectors such as manufacturing, food, hospitals, 
telecommunications, broadcasters, media, infrastructure, transportation and fuel industries have all 
been part of this conversation.  Many lessons were learned during the implementation of ESFs and now 
we must apply those lessons learned to change the way response is implemented.  
Christa von Hillebrandt-Andrade, NOAA NWS Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program, discussed 
missions, products and protocols that can be expected in the event of a tsunami.  Communication is 
crucial because time is of the essence.  Once the earthquake occurs there is limited time for citizens to 
go to high ground (minutes to as most hours).  There are both natural and official warning signs of a 
tsunami that people need to know.  In the case of a local earthquake and tsunami, the first natural 
warning will be strong earthquake shaking; other natural cues are rapid sea level changes and roaring 
sounds.  Self-evacuation is key for survival and requires individuals to identify and act on these natural 
warnings.  Official information will be distributed through federal, state/commonwealth and local 
entities.      
Tsunami warning centers (TWC) monitor seismic and sea level data 24-hours a day, 7-days a 
week.   There are five types of messages that they issue:   
• Warning (highest threat level, inundation expected) 
• Advisory (second level, strong currents expected, but not coastal flooding) 
• Watch (for distant tsunamis, when travel times are greater than three hours, threat level still 
under evaluation) 
• Information Statement (no tsunami threat expected) 
• Cancellation (dangerous waves/currents no longer expected - different from all clear which is 
issued by emergency management indicating safe to return) 
The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) tracks the Caribbean and is responsible for issuing the 
official tsunami alerts for Puerto Rico and the U.S. and British Virgin Islands.  If the TWC detects a strong 
earthquake, the data are analyzed and, if necessary, a message is pushed out to the public and 
authorities through various communication channels.  Communication channels include NOAA Weather 
Radio, Emergency Alert System, NWS website https://tsunami.gov/.  State EOCs, local weather forecast 
offices, the Puerto Rico Seismic Network (in the case of PR and the Virgin Islands) and USCG, which 
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distribute to specified audiences (e.g., USCG in charge of alerting mariners), all support the 
dissemination of tsunami alerts. In the case of a warning, certain wireless phones and other compatible 
mobile devices will receive a Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) from the TWC.  The text like geo targeted 
message will alert of the imminent tsunami threat in the area.  The WEA will probably be the fastest way 
to receive a tsunami warning as it is generated directly from the PTWC.  PRSEMA is also authorized to 
send WEAs. 
Once the initial tsunami warning goes out, local authorities use this information to alert the community 
and initiate evacuation plans.  The warning messages include information useful to emergency 
managers and responders, such as threat level and an estimate time of arrival and forecast wave height 
and duration of the tsunami.  The most important take-away message from Ms. von Hillebrandt-
Andrade was to keep messaging to the public consistent, use a central information source and be 
familiarized with tsunami messaging prior to an emergency response. 
More detailed description of tsunami preparedness was discussed on the third day of the workshop and 
can be found in the NRPT Training Section: Tsunami Scenario. 
 
Day 2 – April 24th, 2019 
Ernesto Morales, NOAA NWS, discussed his agency’s role in assisting decision makers for emergency 
management and preparation before an extreme weather event. The NOAA/NWS mission is to provide 
weather, water and climate data, forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and property and 
enhancement of the national economy.  Within NWS there are two offices: the Weather Forecast Office 
(WFO) San Juan and the National Hurricane Center (NHC), which have the same mission, but a different 
scope.  The NHC focuses on the forecast of the intensity and trajectory of tropical cyclones whereas, 
WFO San Juan concentrates on local forecasts and impacted areas based on the NHC forecast.   
Communication between NWS and emergency managers is an intensive process which begins prior to 
and continues throughout the extreme weather event. Depending upon the timeframe prior to an 
extreme weather event, the types of graphics and information available to decision-maker changes.  
Very long-term forecasts (e.g., 7 day) are less accurate than a short-term forecast (e.g., 48 hour), and 
the graphics available to external partner changes.  Once a cyclone begins forming, and confidence in 
the storm intensity is established, meteorologists conduct hazardous weather outlooks, emergency 
management briefings, media interviews, social media posts, graphicasts and NHC tropical weather 
outlooks.   
As time gets closer to the predicted extreme event (i.e., day 2 to 12 hrs.), NWS puts out multiple 
products: a hurricane local statement, Tropical Cyclone Valid Time Event Code (VTEC), track forecast 
cone, hurricane watch, hurricane warning, and NHC wind speed probabilities.   A new forecast cone is 
developed displacing the old forecast cones; updates include highlighted warnings and a smaller cone 
due to less model error. The newer forecast cones give more information regarding wind speed at the 
center of the cone and miles outside of the center that are likely to be impacted by tropical storm winds.   
As the extreme weather event gets closer (i.e., 12 hr. to 3 hr.), hurricane local statements, Tropical 
Cyclone Watch/Warning (TCV) and other short term standalone products are available to decision 
makers. Just prior to the weather event, a notice of extreme wind, flash floods and other potential 
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hazards is released.  A major lesson learned is the need for decision makers and emergency managers to 
build a relationship with local weather service folks prior to extreme events. This helps build trust and 
formulates a central, official source for weather information.  Additionally, it is important for emergency 
responders to understand how to read forecasts and interpret important graphics. 
A more detailed description regarding how to read and interpret weather and forecast documents is 
covered in the NRPT Training Section: Hurricane & Coastal Flooding Scenario.   
Carlos Irigoyen Gonzalez, Negociado para el Manejo de Emergencias y Administracion de Desastres 
NMEAD, detailed the importance of risk communication, outlined challenges when responding to severe 
weather events and discussed ongoing projects.  During severe weather, it is important to keep in 
contact with the NWS and maintain an official source of information.  Once the official source is 
identified and messages are formed, information needs to be distributed to the 
community.  Information generally flows from the Hurricane Center in Miami and NWS to the EOC 
headquarters, from there to regional EOCs and then to the municipalities.  It is important to have 
redundant systems of communication (e.g., satellite phones, 100 watt radios, internet, media, TV, radio 
stations), such that messages are being properly relayed to municipalities and the public.   
NMEAD is working with FEMA in a pilot program to install new all warning sirens systems, including the 
87 sirens already existing for the Tsunami Program in Puerto Rico, of the 46 sirens in coastal 
municipalities, only 28 are working after Hurricane Maria; the other are still pending for insures 
companies to pay for the repairs. In coordination with FEMA, the new all hazard warning systems will 
cover all municipalities in Puerto Rico.  All hazard warning systems include places such as Guajataca 
Dam, in case it fails a proper warning system would be in place.  Additionally, installation of 100 watt 
radios in different municipalities has been underway, to increase back-up communication in the event of 
an emergency.  There has been a lot of effort to educate communities on preparedness and planning, as 
well as keeping the public engaged about the potential threat of tsunamis and hurricanes.   
Dr. Mirelsa Modestti González, Universidad del Sagrado Corazón, provided feedback and tips on how 
to successfully use social media in the event of a natural disaster or extreme weather event.  It is 
important to recognize that people of all ages and demographics are using social media as a valued 
source of information.  In order to build an audience and maintain followers before an event, 
organizations need to be an online presence by posting on a regular basis. Posts need to be created 
taking into consideration the public and characteristics of the different types of social 
media.  Information needs to be presented in an easy to read manner, with critical information at the 
forefront and secondary information via links to other webpages.  Use of graphics (e.g., videos, 
interactive maps, pictures) and simple, common language in the form of bullets are aesthetically 
pleasing and essential when reaching all demographics. Culture should be taken into consideration 
when developing posts and announcements, and celebrities and 'influencers' should be invited to 
trainings, as they can be extremely valuable because of their outreach. They should have access to 
official information websites and be asked to share official posts on their pages. Also, they should be 
encouraged to have links to official information websites on their fan pages.  
Special care should be taken with certain types of messages. For example, when a Tsunami Warning 
cancellation is emitted, many people will interpret the cancellation as an “all clear” notification and will 
try to go back to their homes. It is of utmost important to state that it is NOT safe to go back to the coast 
before using the word "cancellation". 
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 In the event of an emergency, downloading large files (e.g., videos, graphics) may not be possible given 
data limitations.  Therefore, content should be concise and ingestible when data is limited.  Prior to 
writing public messages, consider the audience trying to be reached (e.g., cultural preferences, 
language). When formulating them, use bolded fonts and colors to convey your information efficiently 
(e.g., bold, red letters indicates warning).  
Misinformation or incomplete information is a problem. During emergencies, many people share 
incorrect or incomplete information. Therefore, a central page for disaster information that can be 
accessed by the public is highly recommended.  In addition, each municipality could use their own 
specific platform as a central form of communication.  It could be used to update the public about open 
or closed roads, available drinking water sources, etc. These platforms can be linked to the central 
disaster information page. Some platforms and social media require less bandwidth than others, and 
this caveat should be considered when choosing or retrofitting an existing central communication 
platform or service. 
V. Breakout Session I 
The first breakout session took place following the plenary presentations on Day 1.  The plenary 
discussion covered federal, state/commonwealth and local government challenges and lessons learned 
through hurricane response.  The participants were divided into four groups (i.e., Groups A, B, C and D).  
Each group was tasked with identifying response challenges and subsequent lessons/skills/practices 
learned as highlighted from plenary presentations.  For each identified response challenge and 
associated lessons learned, the participants compiled information on: type of event, timeframe of 
occurrence, safety of staff or staff families, cross jurisdictional issues, and shared trust resources.  The 
summaries of the breakout group discussions capture major discussion points.  See Appendix D for exact 
wording and all of the identified challenges and lessons learned.     
Group A 
Group A explored eight response challenges, and divided them into: communication, resources, 
preparation and leadership (Table 1).  For example, one response challenge was that as a hurricane 
approaches, community members do not take forecasts seriously because there are too many unofficial 
sources of information.  The lesson learned coming from that discussion was the need to socialize which 
media outlets are reliable, existing official sources of information and unofficial, misleading sources.  
This challenge occurs throughout mission response, and it threatens the safety of staff as well as their 
families and is a cross jurisdictional concern (e.g., federal, commonwealth, municipal).  One solution is to 
conduct ongoing education in schools and at community meetings to inform the public where they can 
find credible sources of information and socialize official information sources such as NWS. 
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Table 1: Response challenges and lessons learned determined by Group A's breakout group discussions. 
Identified Response Challenge Lessons/Practices/Skills Learned  
Desensitizing of alarms  Take culture into account when designing communication 
Not taking forecast seriously  Information needs to put everyone on same page (official source) 
Sources of information Educate public to follow official source(s) of weather information 
Lack of maintenance of 
resources 
Prepared before event, need maintenance logs and funding 
necessary 
Not enough resources Cannot properly respond causing “snowball” effect, improvisation 
insufficient, must plan ahead, stockpile supplies beforehand, 
(access and distribution) *More efficient distribution system that is 
equitable, prior plans (&funding?) of impartial parties responsible 
for distribution of resources to communities (NGO, Red Cross, 
churches) 
Communication infrastructure  Redundancy with options, total loss of communication can happen, 
ham radio can work 
Lack of plans for an event of 
this magnitude  
Need to plan, practice, train for worst case scenarios 
Leadership Empower (training, organizing, informing) communities is crucial, 
developing volunteering structure (cultural shift); in response to 
communities not relying on government, training of leadership, 
 
Group B  
Group B identified 16 response challenges; priority challenges are bolded (Table 2).  Examples of 
response challenge categories included rapid assessments of damage/debris, consideration of policy 
changes to include green technologies when applying for funding, and the need for pre-scripted mission 
assignments.  One response challenge identified by Group B was to avoid restructuring organizations 
during a response, (e.g., do not introduce new sectors or grant managers part way through a disaster 
response).  The lesson learned were: that building a new type of structure during a disaster creates 
added pressure, lack of experience and unclear goals.  While this is a concern throughout mission 
response and recovery activities, it specifically focused on federal jurisdiction and FEMA.  There is an 
added concern for the safety of staff/staff families both mentally and for field safety.  
Table 2: Response challenges and lessons learned determined by Group B's breakout group discussions. 
Identified Response Challenge Lessons/Practices/Skills  Learned  
Response plans exist  Lack of ownership, accountability, dissemination, actualization 
Land Use Plan Enforcement of sensible use of land use plan and zoning; assess on 
paper, but not in reality (i.e., zoning) 
Communicate the severity 
danger/risk 
Because of the size of the island, confidence in the 
forecast/warning; people get desensitized with many hurricanes 
missing Puerto Rico; so many warnings with nothing happening, 
people choose not to respond 
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Simultaneous hazard events may 
require unknown flexibility 
Tabletop exercises that are more complex, multi-scenario, some 
scenarios require staff safety ahead of protocols, need redundancy 
Capacity for multiple, 
simultaneous disasters 
Climate change could lead to stressors to staff/resources/retention.  
Marine/land debris hindered by 
lack of staging areas and logistics 
Pre-identified staging areas needed 
Rapid assessments of 
damage/debris are critical 
Areas that had quick assessments made it easier to scope federal 
funding 
No restructuring of organization 
during a disaster* 
Building a new type of structure during a disaster leads to added 
pressure, lack of experience, unclear goals 
Policy guidelines need to be 
revisited due to new technology 
and climate change* 
Policies need to be revised before an incident 
Police evacuation of people in 
danger zones when cell service 
down 
Pre-emergency coordination with municipalities (door knocking, 
whatsapp) repeat weather messages 
Deadlines need to be flexible, 
but… 
FEMA extends deadlines. Is this good or bad? False expectations. 
Inefficient timeframe 
Broad and bold on initial 
assessments 
Baseline for FEMA to consider funding opportunities (e.g., repair, 
restoration) 
Lack of Pre-Scripted Mission 
Assignments (PSMA)/Duplicity 
of efforts* 
The more pre-scripted mission assignments, the quicker response 
activities can commence and provides training opportunities 
within agencies 
Other Federal Agencies (OFAs) 
need to be assertive in their 
supplemental funding request* 
You snooze, you lose (i.e., there is often a very limited window for 
supplemental funding requests. Identifying the needs and 
collecting the appropriate information must be conducted prior to 
the funding request, making a timely, speedy response more 
difficult. 
Community response efforts. 
Develop a community plan. 
Community members segregating debris; reaching out to the 
elderly; local communities will engage if given the opportunity, they 
take ownership, sense of community (helping your neighbors) 
*Bolding indicates priority items 
Group C 
Group C captured nine response challenges within their discussion (Table 3); ranging from logistics e.g., 
getting resources to the island, and distribution of resources once received), to high turnover rates of 
emergency response positions at the local and commonwealth levels.  One response challenge identified 
by this group was not pre-emptively involving the private sector when developing emergency response 
plans.  A lesson learned was that the private sector be involved during contingency planning in 
coordination with PREMA.  Connecting the private sector to municipalities could improve distribution of 
goods after a disaster, and allow private businesses to contribute to response efforts using their 
connections and assets at all levels (e.g., community, regional). This is a cross jurisdictional problem (i.e., 
federal, regional, local) and spans throughout planning, response and recovery.   
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Table 3: Response challenges and lessons learned determined by Group C's breakout group discussions. 
Identified Response Challenge Lessons/Practices/Skills  Learned  
Communications & interoperability 
between organizations/groups 
Requires a compatible system 
Communication Back to basics- simple solutions (e.g., radio, information 
runners) 
Interpersonal- layers of bureaucracy 
slowed progress 
Need to identify an authority- previously only identified 
problem 
High turnover rate of response 
positions 
Need to maintain and document experiences, and put them 
into practice. Done through education and more trainings 
Pre-emptively involve private sector Involve private sector during contingency planning.  Make the 
link on how to support municipalities/local organizations 
(e.g., transportation/ gas/food) 
Release of emergency supplies in 
ports 
Circumvent barriers using emergency declarations to 
streamline (e.g., turn off taxation during response) 
Assets to people  Use multiple avenues to distribute resources (e.g., NGOs, 
faith based & private) 
Getting community to know and buy 
into existing procedures/frameworks 
Better communication of information & informing 
communities at the grass roots level 
Logistics Pre-planning on how to get resources to the island, and 
distribution in reasonable amount of time 
 
Group D 
Group D highlighted ten response challenges (Table D), ranging from access to clean water, 
identification of vulnerable populations before a disaster, port accessibility during response and lack of 
enforcement of residential building codes.  An example of a response challenge was that vulnerable 
populations (e.g., disabled, sick, elderly) were stranded following Hurricane Maria.  The associated 
lesson learned was not to wait until hospitals are actually impacted by a storm to make decisions, but to 
have a contingency plan for back-up energy sources and access to other necessary resources.  This falls 
under the preparation timeframe including the safety of staff/staff families and is potentially a cross-
jurisdictional concern (e.g., federal, commonwealth). 
Table 4: Response challenges and lessons learned determined by Group D's breakout group discussions. 
Identified Response Challenge Lessons/Practices/Skills  Learned  
Ability to communicate with small 
communities 
Post emergency communication needs to be simple and 
tailored to community 
People inadequately prepared for Category  
4 or 5 hurricane 
Should prepare regardless of category level 
Communities relying on social media and not 
official sources of information 
More outreach about official sources of information  
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Lack of emergency planning Local level preparedness plan created with central point 
of information 
Contingency planning for emergency 
communication 
Need for more than every-day, standard 
communication 
Lack/enforcement of residential building 
codes 
More damage and loss of life due to unsafe structures 
Vulnerable population Hospital will be impacted.  Need redundant or back up 
energy sources 
Access to clean water Anticipation that water shortages occur 
Port accessibility limited because of Jones 
Act 
Necessary aid could not be distributed/get to local 
communities quickly 
Current infrastructure was/is not hurricane 
ready 
Maintain/update infrastructure to withstand hurricanes 
 
VI. Breakout Session II 
Breakout Session II took place on the second day of the workshop, following morning plenary 
presentations.  Participants were asked to expand upon challenges and lessons learned established 
during Breakout Session I.  The challenges and lessons learned were condensed and categorized into one 
of eight categories: communication, infrastructure, leadership, logistics, policy, preparedness, response, 
and logistics.  Each group received the same template.  The template had 23 response challenges and 
lessons learned; the groups were tasked with identifying improvements (i.e., actionable tasks) and how 
their approach would differ with respect to a tsunami or a hurricane.  The number of items each group 
discussed varied, but all 23 items were covered. The summaries below do not detail every topic 
discussed by the groups, but focus on critical points.  See Appendix D for exact language and completed 
templates from each group. The condensed and categorized response challenges included: 
1. Communication 
a. Communication with small communities 
b. Communities relying on social media and not official sources of information 
c. Contingency planning for emergency communication 
d. Communication of the severity of danger/potential risks 
2. Infrastructure 
a. Lack of and enforcement of residential building codes 
b. Lack of access to clean water 
c. Current infrastructure was/is not hurricane ready 
d. Poorly maintained infrastructure 
3. Leadership 
a. High turnover within leadership positions and trained personnel; limited capacity for 
multiple, simultaneous disasters. 
4. Logistics 
a. Port accessibility is limited during response because of existing laws (e.g., Jones Act) 
b. Marine/land debris clean-up hindered by lack of staging areas and removal logistics 
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5. Policy 
a. Land use policy (e.g., rebuilding in high-hazard zone) 
b. Policy guidelines need to be revisited due to change in technology, climate, etc. 
c. Other federal agencies (OFA) need to be assertive in their supplemental funding request 
d. Interpersonal layers of bureaucracy slowed progress (i.e., politics getting in the way of 
progress) 
6. Preparedness 
a. People inadequately prepared for Categories 4 or 5 hurricanes 
b. Lack of emergency planning at family, local and regional levels 
c. Simultaneous hazard events may require unknown flexibility 
d. Lack of Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMA) led to duplicity in efforts 
e. Private sector not pre-emptively involved 
7. Response 
a. Rapid assessments of damage/debris were critical; FEMA needs a baseline to consider 
funding opportunities  
8. Inequity 
a. Vulnerable populations left stranded during/after disasters 
Group A 
Group A discussed 10 of the response challenges, the categories they focused on included: 
communication, infrastructure, leadership, logistics, policy, and preparedness. Within the 
communication category (1b), the group focused on actionable tasks such as certifying official 
information sources so that community members can trust those sites.  This would require community 
outreach, socialization of official sources of information, and learning how to read forecast maps.  
Within the infrastructure category (2b), this group focused on improving access to clean drinking water. 
The actionable tasks included: promoting/educating communities on how to install and fix rainwater 
collection systems, requiring new residential construction to include cisterns or rain collection systems, 
and community workshops to teach members about potential risks associated with drinking untreated 
water.  Under the logistics category, port accessibility in the event of a disaster (4a), and the need for 
establishing a protocol which automatically waives laws such as the Jones Act for a reasonable time 
frame were key.  Another topic of discussion was policy changes with respect to land use (5a), and 
rebuilding in high-hazard areas following a disaster.  The action items include enforcement of existing 
codes, consistency in codes, and implementation of new codes to consider zoned and future land 
planning.  The final category covered was preparedness, lack of emergency planning (6b); this group 
recommended educating/outreach to remind people of the possible devastation following a disaster.  
Keeping the memories fresh in their mind, but also providing avenues to educate communities on how 
to plan and prepare their families.  This could be done in coordination with existing organizations (e.g., 
faith based groups, schools, NGOs), as well as practicing evacuations through exercises.   
Group B 
Group B covered five response challenges within the categories of: communication, policy, preparedness 
and response.  Action items under the communication (1a), included the ability to communicate with 
small communities, and recommendations that responders be aware of language and cultural needs 
when working with various communities.  Following a disaster, there should be multiple, central 
locations where information can be posted regarding weather forecasts and other critical information.  
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Pre-training at the community level would help families understand the necessary resources to survive 
many days following a disaster (e.g., food, water, radio).  Additionally, under the policy category (5b) 
policy guidelines (e.g., PAPPG) should be revisited to include new technology and climate change.  
Potential improvements would require high-level policy agreements on existing FEMA public assistance, 
mitigation and recovery policies.  Within the preparedness category (6a), this group recommended that 
social scientists be active and engaged in community outreach to educate the public and local leaders 
regarding family planning for disasters.  Exercises should be completed at the community level to test 
storm-readiness, and develop a checklist of necessary items families should have in the case of a 
disaster.  Another facet of preparedness includes PSMA (6d) to avoid duplicity of efforts.  This could be 
done by reviewing existing mission assignments, developing new ones and integrating federal mission 
assignments with local response organizations.  Fast-tracking mission assignments could be completed 
with automating approval documents by obtaining signatures ahead of time, and responders could 
prepare for assignments through training and exercises.  During the response and recovery activities, 
communities that conducted quick assessments of damage made it easier to scope federal funding.  
Building from this lesson learned would require a centralized application to collect assessment 
information from multiple sectors.  This would ultimately allow the public to report on their 
municipalities.  
Group C 
Group C covered response challenges under the categories of: communication, preparedness, response, 
and inequity.  With respect to communication challenges, this group provided actionable tasks to 
improve communication with small communities (1a) and contingency planning for emergency 
communication (1c).  These improvements entail using short wave radios for response, satellite phones 
and back-up power sources such as generators, installation of PA systems, low-wattage phones, satellite 
computers and solar powered hard-drives accessible by community members to communicate with 
exterior networks.  Additionally, it is important to educate the community at large on how to use these 
technologies and practice using equipment during planned exercises.  Providing training for 
communities is important to instill emergency readiness at the individual level, because individual 
preparedness leads to a stronger central response.  In addition to communication improvements, there 
was a lack of emergency planning and preparedness (6b) at the local and family level with respect to 
necessary supplies.  This group recommended that aggressive pre-planning would help allow individuals 
to be self-sufficient for a longer period; this would include having appropriate quantities of food and 
water, redundant energy sources, and first-aid/logistical resources (e.g., maps, flash lights).  These tools 
and readiness checklists could be socialized through existing outreach programs (e.g., CERT) and 
practiced in schools and at community centers. During the response phase (7a), rapid assessment of 
damages resulted in a higher likelihood for funding through FEMA.  Therefore, establishing a pre-storm 
baseline would streamline the assessment process and clarify what damage was caused by the recent 
disaster.  Documentation of the current state of infrastructure establishes who is responsible for 
rebuilding after the disaster.  This group discussed the challenge of vulnerable populations being stuck in 
place/stranded following a disaster (8a) and the need for pre-identification of vulnerable populations to 
determine who is at risk, where they are located and how people/community members are accounted 
for during and after a disaster.  
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Group D 
Group D covered five of the eight categories: communication, infrastructure, logistics, preparedness, 
and inequity.  A major topic of discussion was identification of vulnerable populations (8a), through 
preplanning and existing contingency plans.  Assessment of vulnerable populations allows emergency 
responders to preemptively determine the communities’ strengths and weaknesses, who is capable of 
evacuation, and how responders get to those people faster.  The action items included: (1) using census 
and demographic data to identify vulnerable populations during emergency preparedness planning in 
order to focus response efforts during an emergency event; (2) creating compliance checks within low-
income communities to identify any obvious hazards in homes; (3) providing recommendations for 
improvements rather than punitive penalties.  Within the infrastructure category, (2a) enforcement of 
building codes would ensure a safe structure in the event of a disaster; if not possible for all residences, 
there should be a safe structure where the community members can go.  Additionally, community 
outreach efforts should provide training on how to harvest rainwater, install tanks appropriately, the 
importance of treating water prior to drinking it, and solutions such as sand filters or camp filters to 
increase individual self-sufficiency following a disaster.   
VII. Breakout Session III 
The final breakout session took place on the afternoon of Day 2.   Building upon Breakout Session II, 
each group was asked to: (1) recommend steps for implementation, (2) rate the ease of 
implementation, and (3) document any potential coordinating partners.  The summaries below focus on 
high level ease of implementation outlined by each group and/or topics unique to that group discussion.  
For completed templates and exact language, see Appendix D. 
Group A 
Group A highlighted two lessons learned that have the potential to be easily implemented.  They 
focused on improving the maintenance of infrastructure and avoiding rebuilding critical infrastructure in 
high-hazard areas.  In order to improve the maintenance of infrastructure, this group recommended 
that courses and certification programs be developed to authenticate contractors.  This would mandate 
specific training, and teach contractors best management practices when preparing for hurricanes. 
Additionally, Category 4 and 5 rated buildings should be built in centralized locations to provide shelter 
and protection for evacuated families.  This would require coordination between governments and 
engineering organizations, insurance industries and the community.  The second area of improvement 
falls under land-use planning.  This would require identification of risk-prone areas, and development of 
new land use regulations to prohibit new construction within high-hazard areas.  If buildings need to be 
reconstructed in those areas, then they should follow special codes and best practices to ensure 
buildings are structurally sound.  Coordinating partners include local and state governments, permitting 
agencies, municipalities and community members.  
Group B 
This group did not have any lessons learned with a high ease of implementation, but rather prioritized a 
challenging lesson learned.  The lesson learned is that OFAs need to be more assertive in their 
supplemental funding requests.  Some items FEMA cannot fund, but delays in OFA submission requests 
mean they are less likely to be funded. Action items to accomplish this would be identifying and 
establishing consistent language across agencies; each agency should be responsible for educating their 
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employees.  Agencies should be aware of supplemental funding opportunities (i.e., grants, special 
project funding) and responsible for requests relative to their particular mandates.  Socialization of 
coverage/vocabulary could be completed through workshops on how to find funding opportunities, how 
to write grants, petitions, and procurements and how to submit federal grants.  Annual meetings 
needed between local emergency coordinators along with state officials to start knowledge sharing from 
the federal level to the municipal level.  Recommendations for implementation include: (1) interagency 
training on procedures of funding opportunities, (2) a survey for commonwealth agencies to take in 
order to gather post-event lessons learned on the supplemental grant process, (3) awareness raising for 
federal agencies on supplemental funding opportunities (e.g., grant, special project funding) for 
requests relative to their mandates, and (4) federal agencies preparedness with requests to Congress of 
supplemental funding according to their mandates.    
Group C 
Group C focused heavily on local level preparedness, creating contingency and emergency plans that 
direct community members to a central or multiple information source(s) around a community.  Pre-
emergency planning would include local law enforcement, impartial parties (e.g., faith based 
organizations, NGOs) and local emergency managers.  Recommendations for implementation include 
education as a priority.  This would require planning and executing workshops to build knowledge for 
local leaders, parents and/or children to teach families about preparedness planning.  The workshops 
could be broken into regions to allow more people to attend from multiple communities.  They would 
encourage community members to take ownership in emergency planning and promote self-sufficiency.  
This could potentially be done in coordination with NOAA’s Office of Coastal Management and Sea 
Grant.  The second recommendation is focused on outreach efforts (e.g., media blitz).  This would 
include ads at movies, TV commercials, radio announcements, advertisements at stores, etc. to raise 
awareness about how to prepare and develop individual emergency plans and where to find official 
sources of information.  Outreach/education could also take place at public or private classes (e.g., 
home improvement stores), youth organizations (e.g., boy scouts, girl scouts), or faith based 
organizations.  The goal of this is to create self-sufficient communities through empowerment of 
individuals.  Start with a pilot project, in one or two communities, to show that training exercises and 
education can improve preparedness, and would share results at a regional scale to encourage buy-in.  
This would require coordination between communities, NGOs, universities, media outlets, photo 
journalists and emergency management entities.  
Group D 
Group D highlighted two lessons learned that had a high ease of implementation.  The first centered on 
removal of marine/land debris and the other on lack of emergency planning at the family and local level.  
In order to improve removal of debris, Florida’s emergency management plans should be referenced as 
a best management practice document.  Current contingency plans would then be updated to include 
pre-identified staging areas for marine debris, construction/demolition debris, and a final location for 
debris (e.g., landfill on the island vs. shipping off the island).  This would require coordination between 
FEMA, USCG, local emergency managers, NOAA Marine Debris and local public works divisions.  The 
second lesson learned is improving local level preparedness through: (1) re-instituting the CERT program 
in schools, churches, communities, etc., (2) its use in coordination with neighborhood watch programs, 
and (3) use of existing web-apps/phone apps to share information (e.g., “next-door” app).   VITEMA 
models are good and could and potentially be replicated as best management practices.  Consistent 
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messages/information should be socialized at community events.  The final recommendation is 
improving consistency of delivery of information, and institutionalizing self-reliance.  Coordination 
partners include local agencies, emergency management agencies, FEMA, school systems/universities, 
and community members. 
  
VIII. NRPT Training  
The design of the NRPT format includes a day of training.  For this workshop held in Puerto Rico, the 
decision was made to conduct two table top exercises: (1) a tsunami scenario and (2) a coastal 
flooding/hurricane scenario.  The exercises not only allowed for discussion as to good practices and not 
so effective practices, but how to properly interpret and communicate the meaning of watches, 
warnings, and specific NOAA products for decision making.  The participants were divided into four 
groups to discuss and develop messaging products for different phases of these events.  The exercises 
focused on effective communication, specifically: 
What to say and how to say it effectively: fundamentals of risk communication and the use of social and 
traditional media to enhance communications and messaging before, during and after a major coastal 
event.   
Tsunami Scenario 
Prior to the exercise, Christa von Hillebrandt-Andrade and Carolina Hincapié from the NOAA NWS 
Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program, gave an overview about the U.S. Tsunami Warning System.  Real-
time seismic and sea level data are collected and sent through satellites to Tsunami Warning Centers 
(TWCs); the Pacific TWC (PTWC) covers the Caribbean region.  If data shows anything out of the 
ordinary, it is reviewed and if necessary, a warning is sent from the PTWC through satellites to the NWS 
Gateway, State Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and the USCG (Figure 1).  From there, each of 
those groups is responsible for distributing the warning message.  The NWS Gateway sends out a 
wireless emergency alert (WEA) to those in coastal zones and in locations under threat.  Additionally, 
the NWS Gateway distributes the message to the NWS San Juan Forecast Office (SJFO) activating (1) 
NOAA Weather Radio, and (2) Emergency Alert System (EAS) (e.g., TV, radio, fax).  The State EOCs send 
warning messages to the local EOCs, and from there the local EOCs alert TV stations and local 
alarms/sirens.  The USCG is responsible for notifying mariners, harbor and port masters, and releases a 
PanPan message (i.e., critical message for mariners).  There are multiple routes of communication, some 
methods include: voice, text (satellite based), internet, phone and mobile technology (Figure 2).  Each 
tsunami ready center has an office, and receives warning messages through multiple mechanisms (e.g., 
fax, NOAA weather radio, internet).   
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Figure 1: Communication diagram used by the United States Tsunami Warning System 
 
Figure 2: Routes of communication used by the United States Tsunami Warning Centers in the case of an 
emergency. 
The official roles for the tsunami warning process start with the TWC, which is responsible for 
determining alert level and issuing the message (e.g., PTWC).  The tsunami warning focuses, those 
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responsible for disseminating official alerts to authorities and the public including: (1) Puerto Rico State 
Emergency Bureau; (2) WEA; (3) VHF radio; (4) U.S. Virgin Islands Emergency Management Agency 
(VITEMA); (5) NWS SJFO to activate the NOAA weather radio, EAS and social media; and, (6) PRSN as an 
alternated tsunami warning focal point for PR and USVI, RSS, website, social media, VHF radio and ham 
radio.   
The overview included a step-by-step discussion of the messages sent by the PTWC.  Messages are 
issued in both English and Spanish and can be found at tsunami.gov, and in the case of a tsunami threat, 
include critical information such as: (1) message number, (2) who is sending the message, (3) time and 
date of message, (4) alert level, (5) parameters including location, magnitude and depth,, (6) earliest 
estimated time for tsunami arrival in coastal regions, (7) recommended actions to protect human life 
(e.g., evacuation, move to 4th story) (8) specific information about what NOT to do, (9) forecasts of 
tsunami activity, (10) anticipation of flooding/inundation, and (11) information about the next update. 
As time passes, more messages are sent to update information.  For example, Message 2 includes 
information such as: updated estimated time of arrivals, height and duration of tsunami, and revision of 
earthquake magnitude, if necessary.  Message 3 contains updates and confirmation of wave heights.  
The final cancellation message directs the public listen to local, public authorities for the official “all 
clear”.  
The short version of the message which is sent through WEAs to individual cell phones, currently reads: 
Tsunami danger on the coast. Go to high ground or move inland. Listen to local news. -NWS  
As part of WEA modernization, after much discussion the NWS has recommended a new message and 
send alerts in both Spanish and English depending upon the individual’s preference.   After review of 
messaging, it was determined that the order of message content is important. In addition to the shorter 
message (90 character), a longer message (360 character) has also been agreed upon and is awaiting 
FEMA for implementation.  For shorter messages, the order of content is as follows: source, guidance, 
hazard, location, time. The newly proposed English message reads: 
NWS: Tsunami danger on the coast.  Move to high ground or inland now. 
The order of content for the larger messages is slightly different.  It includes: source, hazard, location, 
time and guidance.  Participants quickly learned that there is very little time for action once the warning 
is provided; it was stressed that they need to know what to do and act quickly. The proposed longer 
message, in English reads:  
The National Weather Service has issued a tsunami warning.  A series of powerful waves and strong 
currents may impact coasts near you. You are in danger. Get away from coastal waters. Move to high 
ground or inland now. Keep away for the coast until local officials say it is safe to return. Check local 
media for more information after you are safe. 
The Tsunami Scenario learning objectives were: 
1. Familiarization with TWC products and timelines 
2. Improvement of communication of the threat message in PR/USVI by official Tsunami Warning 
Focal Point (TWFP) and social influencers. 
3. Focus on four stages of warning: 
• Response to earthquake shaking 
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• Tsunami warning 
• Tsunami confirmation 
• Warning cancellation 
• All clear 
The participants were divided into four groups, groups included members with critical messaging roles, 
other members who acted as social influencers during the warning, and those who would normally be 
located outside of the Caribbean region.  There were five activities.  The first activity was done 
individually, but all others were conducted as a group.  The five activities mimicked time as it would 
occur during a real event; members were to document their individual response as well as group 
discussion and messaging.   
The activities included:   
• Activity 1: Communications based on natural signs  
• Activity 2: Communications with Message #1 
• Activity 3: Communications with Message #3 
• Activity 4: Communications with Message #8 
• Activity 5: Communications for Response and All Clear 
Tsunami Scenario Overview:  
A magnitude 7.9 earthquake NE of Puerto Rico occurred at 11:00 PM.  The earthquake occurred in the 
Puerto Rico Trench, where the North American Plate subducts under the Caribbean Plate.  
This training included discussing the impact of a local tsunami to at-risk communities along the coast, 
examined the types of TWC messages in the scenario, and considered type, timing, audience and 
mechanisms for communications.  
Activity 1:  The earthquake is strong and is felt at 11:00 PM.  Some buildings collapse; phone lines are 
immediately jammed as everyone tries to find out what happened.  No TWC messages have been issued 
yet.  The earthquake shaking occurred for 1 minute, during which time folk would likely be protecting 
themselves.  The first scenario asked participants what they would do in the first three minutes 
(including the 1 minute of shaking).  The following questions were answered by each individual: (1) How 
do you respond to the earthquake?  (2) What do you think is going to happen (list the risks).  (3) What 
can you do to communicate, to whom and how are you going to do it? 
One member from Group B, who works at the Seismic Network of Puerto Rico (PRSN) pretended as 
though he was working on shift and saw information about the earthquake.  Once the shaking began, he 
protected himself, waited until it was over and then watched his monitor to see if there was going to be 
another earthquake. Upon determining there was not another earthquake threat, he proceeded to try 
and send a rapid earthquake alert and establish that his partner was safe.  If the partner was safe, then 
that person would try and establish communication with the PTWC.  If no communication was available, 
there might be an issue with communication lines.  If no information was received from PTWC then it is 
anticipated that all routes of communication are down; if no message from the PTWC comes within 5 
minutes, then they radio to PREMA the magnitude and depth of the quake.  If it is 100 km or shallower, 
PREMA must be provided with tsunami warning or watch information.  
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The participant representing PREMA assumed from the intensity and length of the earthquake that a 
tsunami was a high possibility.  Therefore, he contacted local offices/regions to start evacuations 
immediately.  Most other participants were either social influencers or out of the Caribbean region at 
the time of the event.  Social influencers were focused on protecting themselves and establishing if their 
families were safe; some people were shocked by what happened and froze for a minute or two.  Some 
said they attempted to contact community members, but did not want to clog-up lines of 
communication.   
Activity 2: The time is now 11:03 PM, PTWC has issued its first message.  Telephones are jammed, social 
media is viral, and the earthquake impact has been significant.  Groups were then given 5 minutes to 
determine individual action, and 15 minutes for group discussion.  Participants were asked to answer: 
(1) What and how did you receive the official product?  (2) What is the alert level?  (3) What is the 
expected time of arrival of the tsunami?  (4) What, to whom, how and when are you going to 
communicate?  
In terms of receiving official products, the answer would be through aWEBs (tsunami.gov) and WEAs.  
The next step is relaying NWS messaging.  This would be via NOAA weather radio, fax, and phone calls; if 
normal lines of communication are down then satellite phones or radio would be necessary.  The alert 
level is a warning and would be included in the message.  The entire island must be included when 
issuing directions; messaging would be the same for all regions.  Areas highlighted in yellow on the 
provided tsunami evacuation areas were designated as priority evacuation regions.  Information would 
be shared with local EOCs and sirens sounded to alert areas under threat.  Messaging should focus on 
the need for community members to get to higher ground (e.g., parking garage is a great option) or to 
the 4th story of a building and to remain there until local emergency response gives the “all clear”. 
Social influencers said they would re-tweet information put out by official sources (e.g., NWS, SJFO), 
contact neighborhood watch programs to see if community members are safe, and continue moving 
themselves and families to higher ground if they were in a threatened area.  Some discussion focused on 
confusion about official sources’ language in messaging; making sure it is clear to the public, avoiding 
use of acronyms and providing specific directions (e.g., imminent danger- get to higher ground). 
Activity 3: It is now 11:55 PM, and the PTWC Message #3 has been issued.  Media is reporting the 
tsunami is inundating the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico; additionally, reports are showing that 
people are flocking to beaches to watch the arrival of the tsunami.  This is causing coastal evacuation 
problems. The groups were tasked with identifying their actions over the next five minutes, followed by 
a 15-minute group discussion answering the questions: (1) What important new information does the 
message include, and (2) What, to whom, how and when are you going to communicate? 
USCG participants mentioned that the communication center is in a tsunami risk area, and therefore, 
the center may not be functional if they are in the middle of evacuating.  There are alternative 
operations centers, but the ultimate conclusion was that there would be limited capabilities in them.  A 
take-away from this discussion was that in the case of a tsunami, it is unclear how USCG would issue 
warnings to mariners if the operations center is evacuating.    
PREMA has sent their evacuation messages and continues to send out alerts with the time of wave 
arrival as it was described in the third message from the PTWC.  After hearing media reports of people 
swarming beaches, PREMA contacted local media to encourage people to evacuate and keep away from 
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coastal zones.  If people continue to swarm beaches, then the National Guard will be activated to move 
people inland.  At the same time, PREMA is dealing with problems that arose as a result of the 
earthquake, such as power outages, road blocks and hospital damages.   
A VITEMA spokesperson said that because it is a small island, information gets distributed quickly and 
emergency response is mobilized at a fast pace.  When relaying important information to the public, 
specific estimated time of wave arrival should be avoided because if it does not hit at that time then 
people assume the threat is over and they are safe.  Communicate after that the public must continue to 
evacuate threated areas and remain evacuated until further notice from local authorities.  Due to 
limited resources, VITEMA focused their efforts in locations where the wave is expected to arrive first, 
especially on evacuating vulnerable populations (e.g., hospitals, schools).   
The PRSN receives an alert within five minutes after the earthquake, indicating that lines of 
communication are open ultimately allowing for information updates (e.g., magnitude of quake, 
estimated time of wave arrival).  Messages from the Seismic Network continue to encourage evacuation.  
Even after the first wave makes landfall, there is still a high risk of larger waves following.  The next step 
would be to update/change which municipalities are flooded, the tsunami height, arrival time and 
duration.  Continuous monitoring of tide gauges and UNESCO IOC water monitoring stations to see 
water level changes in real time is on-going.   
Social influencers would try to share official sources of information, and warn people not to go into the 
streets after the first wave because more could be coming.  
Activity 4: It is now 0225 AM, and the PTWC Message #8 is released; media reports the tsunami has 
inundated Puerto Rico coasts, and people are wanting to enter the evacuated areas.  The groups have 
five minutes for action and five minutes of group discussion about: (1) what important new information 
should the message include, and (2) what, to whom, how and when to communicate? 
There is a lot of controversy regarding Message #8 from the PTWC.  The word “cancellation”, for most 
people, means that evacuation zones are safe, and people can return.  However, in this case, it means 
there is no more threat of a tsunami, and that the public should seek information from their local 
authorities about returning to evacuation zones.  The threat of a tsunami is over, but the resulting 
damages from waves/flooding is mostly unknown and could pose life-threatening scenarios in coastal 
zones.  PRSN recommends communities wait for further information from PREMA regarding when it is 
safe to return to their evacuated/affected areas.  Concerns of how the media would interpret this 
message was discussed, and the PRSN representative said that they do outreach with local media to 
educate them about language used in warning messages.  The warning messages are a public document, 
therefore, upfront education helps to eliminate the spread of misinformation.  An action item that came 
out of this discussion was, rather than using the word ‘cancellation’; the term ‘end of tsunami threat’ 
should replace it because that phrase is clear and concise.   
A second action item was that other media outlets such as news broadcasters, and radio announcers 
should be trained about how to interpret PRSN messages and how the media should relay information.  
The media should keep messages simple, and avoid talking about the earthquake magnitude until after 
the event is over.  Additionally, more outreach in schools would hopefully help educate people about 
terminology surrounding physical sciences to help prevent false information. 
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Activity 5: It is now 7 AM and the Puerto Rican Governor’s press conference is taking place.  Topics 
covered in the press conference include: (1) an initial report of the event and its effects, (2) an 
announcement that emergency management officials are in the field performing evaluations and will be 
the ones to issue the “all clear” when evacuated areas are safe, and (3) the fact that a curfew for citizens 
not participating in emergency response will be enforced.  At this point, all participants have assumed 
their agency roles, and have 10-minutes to discuss: (1) what is the government guidance?  (2) What are 
additional information sources?  (3) What, to whom, how and when are you going to communicate?  (4) 
What will be the roles in response? 
At this point, participants said they would re-tweet official sources of information if there was access to 
the internet.  WhatsApp is a great avenue for communication because it generally requires less 
data/bandwidth than social media outlets.  When communicating to the public, social influencers would 
post messages such as: i) stay clear of activities, ii) it is important to let authority do their job, iii) be 
cautious of earthquake associated risks (e.g., collapse of structures), iv) go to the closest shelter, or v) do 
not return to evacuated areas until the official agency says it is safe to do so.  An important take-away is 
the need for pre-emptive action to educate the public about emergency preparedness, and encourage 
self-sufficiency (i.e., what are you going to do to improve your situation?).   
From the perspective of NOAA DPP in Mobile, AL; part of the role for DPP is supporting response 
coordination and information flow up through senior leadership.  The first action would be to account 
for all NOS personnel in affected areas.  Coordination of incident management and response such as 
mobilizing the National Geodetic Survey for an aerial survey and getting teams to support the USCG and 
EPA associated with hazmat and opening ports/navigational channels.  The Office of Coastal Zone 
Management would be used to assist in anyway necessary; most importantly to get confirmation that 
folks in affected areas are safe (i.e., encourage a communications list or phone tree).   
Hurricane & Coastal Flooding Scenario 
The second scenario was led by Ernesto Rodriguez and Odalys Martinez, WFOSJ, regarding 
communications for a hurricane and coastal flooding scenario.  There was an initial presentation 
reminding participants how to read forecasts, which forecasts to use as the hurricane approaches and 
how the WFO knowledge changes as a storm approaches (Figure 3).  Providing responders with as much 
information as possible is important when preparing for a hurricane.  When the hurricane is many days 
out (e.g., 7 days), guidance is general and there is minimal knowledge of the potentially impacted area, 
but as the hurricane approaches land, forecasts become more precise and information is provided for 
pre-staging operations.   
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Figure 3: The timeline showing how WFO knowledge changes as a storm approaches, and forecast 
graphics that should be used with respect to hours until peak impact. 
Five-day outlooks can be used to monitor a potential cyclone.  Figure 4 shows an orange track, which is 
the area of tropical storm formation potential; the chance of formation is illustrated by the color (i.e., 
yellow=low risk, orange=moderate, red=high).  The hatched (orange shaded) area does not represent 
trajectory, it is the area where conditions are favorable for development. The graphic has an associated 
text-box which outlines the potential formation chances through a 48-hour and 5-day timeframe.  It 
discusses which direction the storm is approaching from, the direction it is moving, and how quickly it is 
moving.  As the storm gets closer to landfall, forecasters can more accurately predict the formation 
chance, time to landfall and the subsequent impacts (e.g., heavy rainfall). 
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Figure 4: An example of a five-day graphical tropical weather outlook showing one disturbance (orange). 
In general, the media does not cover hurricanes until there is a cone of uncertainty.  NWS forecasters 
are monitoring its movement, development and track, but the model accuracy is not good enough to 
capture the attention of media outlets.  The goal is to get information out to emergency managers as 
early as possible in order for them to start planning evacuation routes, staging equipment, etc.  Due to 
associated costs with emergency planning (e.g., shipping equipment), the NWS does not tell partners 
about a potential storm event until they are confident in their predictions.  The warnings of a storm can 
begin as early as 7-days; these will consist of email briefings, but will not give the exact location or 
impacts.   
Module 1: Pre-Storm 
1. What should be considered when interpreting the Potential Tropical Cyclone Forecasts? 
Potential Tropical Cyclone Forecasts are issued only for systems threatening land within the watch or 
warning time period.  Forecasts are likely to have greater uncertainty the further out they are.  The NHC 
issues early advisories for weather systems that pose a long-range threat to the U.S. or other land areas. 
An internal Model Guidance forecast track was shown to participants to illustrate the complexity of 
forecast models.  Different models have different tracks; they are called “members”.  All models have a 
purpose and limitations, some of the model types are: climatological, historic, and deterministic or 
NRPT: Learning from the Past and Moving Forward: 
Response Challenges from Severe Weather or Tsunamis to Shared Trust Resources & Mission Responsibilities 
Coastal Response Research Center  Page 32 
 
ensemble.   Comparing the outputs of multiple models provides forecasters and decision makers with 
more data to make an informed decision.  Forecasts are generally accurate 48-72 hours prior to an 
event, further out than 72 hours the uncertainty increases exponentially and model outputs vary 
dramatically (Figure 5).  Typical NHC track errors are: i) 2-day error ~ 75 nautical miles (n mi), ii) 3-day 
error ~ 110 n mi, iii) 4-day error ~160 n mi, and iv) 5-day error ~ 220 n mi. 
 
Figure 5: An example of internal Model Guidance of intensity forecasts, illustrating that model 
uncertainties increases with respect to forecast hour. 
Models with cones of uncertainty explain two things, the timing of the cyclone and the related 
uncertainty.  Error is not storm dependent.  It is based on the 5-year historic averages and is included in 
every forecast track.  Figure 6 is an example of a forecast with a cone of uncertainty.  The hatched area 
is the 4 to 5-day outlook, and the solid white area is a 1 to 3-day outlook.  The letters in the middle of 
the track represent different wind speeds.  The cone itself contains the probable path of the storm 
center, but does not show its size.  Hazardous conditions can occur outside of the cone. Additionally, the 
orange circle with the black dot, shows the current known information such as sustained winds and 
direction of movement.  The goal is to send out an updated forecast every 6 hours; as computers get 
faster the ability to run models more often increases.  It is generally hard to identify the center of a 
hurricane as it is developing, but as it intensifies the center is more obvious to forecasters.   
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Figure 6: Example of a forecast graphic showing the cone of uncertainty (white area); showing the timing 
of the cyclone and the related uncertainty. 
The graphic, Most Likely Arrival Time of Tropical-Storm-Force Winds, is more recently developed and can 
be used by decision makers to decide when business, schools, etc. should be closed because of high 
winds (Figure 7).  The figure uses a color map to show the five-day chance of receiving sustained winds 
of 34 knots or greater; dark green indicates ~5-10% chance, whereas the purple represents a 100% 
chance.  The storm location and wind speed are indicated by a small symbol.  This graphic shows that 
winds will likely be expected in that location at the specified time.   
 
Figure 7: A forecast graphic that can be used for emergency preparedness to show the “Most Likely 
Arrival Time of Tropical-Storm-Force Winds”.  
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2. What storm surge product should be used for planning purposes? 
National Storm Surge Hazard Maps include the Maximum Envelop of Water (MEOW) and Maximum of 
MEOWs (MOMs).  MEOWs are used operationally when narrowing decisions to a specific location, 
whereas MOMs are used in planning to design evacuation zones and operationally when uncertainty is 
high.  Additionally, MOMs are used for mapping steep boundaries, when inundation is close to shore, 
and coastal damage is not extended inland. 
Module 2: Close to Landfall 
1. How can you determine when preparation should be rushed to finish based on the arrival of 
tropical storm force winds? 
The graphic, “earliest reasonable arrival time of tropical-storm force winds”, should be used to 
determine when preparation should be completed.  By that time, individuals can safely assume that 
they can prepare for tropical-storm force winds.  When winds are 35 knots or greater people should 
hunker down. Information that can be obtained from this graphic includes: (1) the expected, or most-
likely time for the onset of tropical-storm force winds, and (2) that individuals may have this much time, 
but should not plan on using it. 
2. What is the difference between a hurricane watch and a warning?  
A hurricane warning means that conditions are expected, whereas a hurricane watch is used when 
conditions are possible in a specified area (e.g., sustained winds of 74 mph or higher).  Hurricane 
warnings indicate that hurricane conditions (i.e., sustained winds of 74 mph or higher) are expected 
somewhere within the specified area.  The hurricane warning is issued 36 hours in advance of the 
anticipated onset of tropical storm-force winds to allow for important preparation. A watch is issued 48 
hours in advance of the anticipated onset of tropical storm-force winds in an area.   
3. What is the difference between extreme and severe WEA emergency alerts? 
Hurricanes use the word extreme and flash floods use the word severe.  
4. Which product provides a good overview of the overall tropical impacts situation?  
A Hurricane Local Statement (HLS) is a good overview of the overall tropical situation in a given CWA.  It 
provides a summary of the worst impacts to plan for with aerial descriptions.  It does NOT contain 
specific meteorological or threat information.  It is NOT detailed for decision makers. The HLS contains a 
header, followed by any new information that has been issued (e.g., changes to watches and warnings), 
potential hazards (e.g., winds), potential impacts (e.g., structural damage), precautionary/preparedness 
actions or statements (e.g., evacuations) and the time that the next update will be sent out (e.g., issued 
by NWS for San Juan, PR around 8 PM Atlantic Standard Time (AST), or sooner, if conditions warrant). 
The hurricane’s threat and impacts can be found in the form of a graphic, possible threats include wind, 
storm surge, flooding rain, and tornados.  The type of threat can be selected for a specific location using 
the National Digital Forecast Database Graphical Forecasts at weather.gov.  After choosing the threat, 
the level will be color coded (e.g., yellow = elevated, pink = extreme).  The map provides the reasonable 
worst-case scenario, taking into account the forecast magnitude of the hazard, along with the associated 
uncertainty of the forecast. Grids are available at: https://digital.weather.gov/.  
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Module 3: Landfall  
1. When is an Extreme Wind Warning (EWW) issued? 
It is only issued in association with major hurricanes.  The criteria for an EWW is sustained surface winds 
of 115 mph or greater.  The EWW is intended to alert the public to prepare for potentially life-
threatening conditions.  In the instance of Hurricane Irma, three EWW were issued by WFOSJ. 
2. What is the difference between a flash flood warning and flash flood emergency? 
A flash flood warning informs individuals that flash flooding is in progress, imminent, or highly likely.  
Flash flood warnings are urgent messages that dangerous flooding can develop very rapidly, with a 
serious threat to life and/or property (i.e., warnings issued for areas usually expect flooding).  A flash 
flood emergency is an exceptionally rare life-threating situation (i.e., people are unaware that flooding is 
going to take place in that location).  Examples of flash flood situations include: (1) a total failure of a 
major dam, (2) multiple swift water rescue teams have been or are being deployed in response to flash 
flooding of an exceptional magnitude, and (3) water has rapidly risen or will rapidly rise to levels where 
people who are ordinarily in safe locations during previous flash flood events are no longer safe.  
Module 4: Post-Storm 
1. After warnings and watches have expired, what products are issued? 
WFOSJ returns to normal operations.  Any weather hazard is then treated on a case-by-case scenario 
(e.g., flash flood warning, severe thunderstorm warning, hazard weather outlook).  If required, WFOSJ 
will provide IDSS briefings in order to assist in the recovery process.  
Scenario Overview 
Using information discussed in Modules 1-4, groups were asked a series of questions when provided the 
necessary tools (e.g., graphics, text).  All participants assumed the role of state emergency managers 
and were required to provide the Tropical Cyclone Formation Chance to regional emergency managers.  
The activity was divided into four parts: 1) Preparation, 2) Preparation and Threats-Tropical Cyclone 
Watches and Warnings in Effect, 3) Risk Communication, and 4) Ongoing Threats-Tropical Cyclone 
Watches and Warnings in Effect.  Most of the questions asked during training can be found in 
descriptions of Modules 1-4.  For the specific questions asked during this exercise, see Appendix E. 
Following the exercise, the group discussed important lessons learned from the exercise or prior 
experience.  A lesson learned from St. Croix’s hurricane preparation was that school and work were 
cancelled the day before a major hurricane in order to encourage families to prepare.  A curfew was also 
enforced.  A major take-away from this exercise was that the HLS covers various potential hazards and 
threats associated with the hurricane.  Prior to the storm hitting, the NWS sends out an overview of the 
situation, assuming that people will not have access to information updates during the storm event.  For 
some of the potential threats; the phrase “unfolding” was used; this raised concern because it did not 
have a word associated with it to describe the threat level (e.g., elevated, extreme).  “Unfolding” 
explains that the hazard is already occurring, but does not specifically describe how detrimental it will be 
or how conditions will change over time.  Feedback from the group was that a precautionary statement 
should be included regarding the threat level, and that the maximum expected threat level and the 
expected time frame of the threat be included (i.e., “potential, elevated” or “unfolding, catastrophic”). 
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IX. Conclusion and Outcomes 
Common themes throughout the workshop’s plenary presentations and breakout group discussions 
were compiled and distilled into 19 lessons learned (Appendix F).  Three major outcomes were identified 
as high priority items: 1) the need to identify vulnerable populations, 2) updating PSMAs, and 3) 
improving local level preparedness.  Items one and two have specific end-goals and action items 
associated with the lessons learned, whereas, item three was broken into multiple parts, and requires 
extensive local, state and federal coordination.   
An outcome highlighted by participants was the need to identify vulnerable populations prior to a 
disaster, and ensure that all hospitals have back-up power sources, multiple lines of communication 
(e.g., 100 Watt radios), and conduct employee training and exercises.  If municipalities have not already 
identified vulnerable populations within their communities, then they should be identified and 
information should be added to contingency plans and updated regularly.  
An action item included the need for more PSMAs; this would enable faster response activities and 
minimize duplicity of efforts at the federal and state level.  Federal organizations (e.g., FEMA, NOAA) 
need to review existing PSMAs and potentially develop new ones in coordination with local emergency 
managers.  Outreach to state and local level is necessary to establish what local needs are to 
appropriately determine mission assignments.  Pre-emptively determining PSMAs would allow 
responders to train and prepare for assignments, ultimately resulting in a rapid response time and more 
damage assessment.  A major lesson learned from Hurricane Maria was that areas/communities who 
boldly and promptly performed initial damage assessments made it easier to scope federal funding.  An 
outcome from this workshop was therefore a need to a set a baseline for areas without one, to enable a 
rapid damage assessment and begin the restoration process.  This could be stream lined by a 
standardized application used to collect assessment information for multiple sectors, establishing a 
centralized communication center during the assessment process, educate employees on external 
funding opportunities and training on grant writing and submissions.  
A reoccurring theme was the need to focus disaster preparedness and planning at the community and 
individual level.  This would include outreach programs educating community members regarding 
official sources of information (e.g., NWS, emergency managers), where to find information before, 
during and after a disaster.  Setting up contacts within the community and establishing central 
information locations.  Trainings would help community members prepare resources necessary to 
encourage self-sufficiency after a disaster, and educational opportunities to improve individual 
preparedness (e.g., rainwater harvesting).  Through these outreach events and trainings, the concept of 
disaster readiness would remain current and at the forefront of community planning.  Additionally, it 
would professionalize emergency management and response positions, and raise awareness around the 
need for emergency management curriculum at the grade school and university levels.  Participants 
agreed these tasks will be challenging to develop, and coordination among local, state and federal levels 
will be necessary.  
Local, state and federal disaster readiness and decision making can be enhanced by applying these 
lessons learned.  The action items outlined by this report will help facilitate a strong emergency 
response network in the Caribbean region, enhance effective mission response and recovery activities, 


























































































































































































































































































































































































NOAA REGIONAL PREPAREDNESS TRAINING 
1. Recognize Charlie Henry from NOAA’s Disaster Preparedness Program and Nancy Kinner Director of 
the Coastal Response Research Center 
 
2. Learning from the Past and Moving Forward: Challenges from Severe Natural Events to Shared Trust 
Resources and Mission Responsibilities  
o Lessons Learned (ESF-10 – Chemical and Oil Spills):  
 19 Superfund (NPL) and 177 regulated facilities  
 Sunken and grounded vessels (377 in PR and 477 in USVI), oil, fuel,  and hazardous waste 
removal / marine debris impacts to coral reefs (Mona case) 
 Disaster debris management and household hazardous wastes (12 million cubic yards of 
debris, 52% construction debris and 44% of vegetative debris) (322,148 HHW containers in 
PR and 145,575 containers in USVI) 
 Wastewater treatment plants and pump stations (22 WWTP of 51 out of service, 3 facilities 
completely flooded (Dorado, Toa Alta, and San Sebastian) and 222 pump stations out of 714 
out of service / largest WW pump station in Torrecillas - Loiza had major damages with 25 
MGD = sewage overflows, collapsed trunk sewers or main pump station with problems) 
 Stormwater system management (municipalities mapping and ownership, coastal flooding) 
 Restoration of water quality monitoring network / Air quality monitoring network (how safe 
to use surface and coastal waters (river, streams, beaches)?) 
 Sargassum accumulation 
 
o Recognize our challenges and vulnerabilities: 
 Pre-existing conditions exacerbated by the hurricanes (fiscal situation, deterioration of 
infrastructure, lack of maintenance, lack of resources (staff and equipment), history of non-
compliance, threats from extreme weather and natural disaster events – hurricanes, 
drought, precipitation, sea level rise, salinity intrusion to aquifers, etc.) 
 
o Moving Forward in Preparedness Planning: 
A. Multisectoral and multidisciplinary engagement for emergency preparedness, role 
clarification, “Being prepared is not a one time effort” – continuous improvement: 
• Local Government (DNER, PREMA,) 
• Federal Government (NOAA, DOI, USCG, FEMA, USACE, EPA) 
• Academia (UPR, Sea Grant, CARICOOS, PR Seismic Network, American University, Sacred 
Heart University) 
• NGOs (Para la Naturaleza, Foundation for Puerto Rico, ISER-Caribe) 
• Private Sector (Crespo Advisors) 
B. Emergency management plans: pre-selected locations for temporary staging areas, pre-
agreements with municipalities, waivers and permit pre-approvals with local and federal 
agencies 
C. Leveraging resources:  Disaster recovery plan for PR = more than $139 billion / USVI = $7.5 
billion (Federal Govt allocated approximately $45 billion) 
D. Watershed approach - Role of green infrastructure in disaster recovery (wetlands, coral 
reefs) as our shared Trust resources 
E. Risk communications – before, during, and after an event 
 
o Thank you! 
 Recognize EPA Staff (Sergio Bosques, Paul Fericelli and Carlos Huertas) – Thank you Sergio 











THIS WORKSHOP PROVIDED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH:



















































































































































































Learning from the Past, 
Improvement for the Future
NOAA National Weather Service
WFO San Juan
Ernesto Rodriguez
Science and Operation Officer




NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Hurricane Maria
From the National Weather Service’s Perspective 
Lessons learned after Hurricane Maria
Major Hurricane Maria
Improvement for the Future




A Weather-Ready Nation 
Society is prepared for 
and responds to weather, 
water, and climate-
dependent events.
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Mission:
Provide weather, water, 
and climate data, forecasts 
and warnings for the 
protection of life and 
property and enhancement 
of the national economy.
PREPARATION












Sep 20 - Oct 23
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Hurricane Maria from the National Weather Service’s  San Juan Perspective
Building TRUST
NWS San Juan build trust with decision makers of U.S. 
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico through table top, full-scale 
exercises and outreach activities before the Hurricane 
Season.
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Pre-event
COORDINATION
Briefings with the Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands state 
and federal agencies.
Core Partners use the 
information provided by the 
National Weather Service San 
Juan to make critical decisions.
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
NWS Internal
COORDINATION
● Numerous coordination calls with the 
National Hurricane Center, Weather 
Prediction Center and the Southeast River 
Forecast Center were made before the 
hurricane affected the warning area.
● Conference calls and planning meetings
with Southern Region  and WFO Miami.
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Lesson learned after Hurricane Maria
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Lesson learned after Hurricane Maria








Utilized two way radio and satellite phones
to get information on the flooding situation.
Forecasters at the Emergency Operation 
Center kept updating our core partners.
After failed attempts to reach out the public, 
the office contacted the only radio station 
working at that time to brief the public on 
current situation and forecast.
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Improvement for the Future
Tailored forecast through Impact Decision Support Services (IDSS)
IDSS are forecast advice and 
interpretative services the NWS provides 
to help core partners, such as 
emergency personnel and public safety 
officials, make decisions when weather, 
water and climate impacts the lives and 
property. 
NOAA Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Improvement for the Future
Tailored forecast through Impact Decision Support Services (IDSS)
This support may be needed in response to a particular event
or routinely to support high-value decision making.




@Edgar Rodriguez@Jose Soto Anglero
@waltersotoleon @Ektor79
@wilfredodiazPR @NadeshaWAPA
Enhance climate services to help communities, businesses, and 
governments understand and adapt to climate-related risks
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U.S. Coast Guard
NOAA Regional Preparedness 
and Training Workshop
Response Challenges from 
Severe Weather and/or Tsunamis
Office of Marine Environmental 
Response Policy (CG-MER) 




• Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) as amended by 
CWA (1972)
– Oil Pollution Act (OPA90)
– Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
• Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation 
Liabilities Act (CERCLA) 
Regulatory Authority
• 40 CFR 300 National Contingency Plan
2
MEP & MER Missions
Marine Environmental Protection
• Regulate the discharge of oil, HAZSUB, and other 
shipboard wastes into U.S. and international waterways 
• Protect marine life and ecosystems 
• Regulate invasive species into U.S. waterways 
Marine Environmental Response
• Respond to oil and hazardous substance incidents
• Develop environmental regulations and standards
Federal On Scene Coordinator
FOSC Roles & Responsibilities IAW NCP:
• Provides access to federal resources and technical 
assistance
• Coordinates all federal containment, removal, and disposal 
efforts and resources during an oil spill or hazardous 
material release
• Coordinates, monitors, and directs response efforts
3
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On-Scene Coordinator
• Predesignated official 
responsible to coordinate and 
direct responses to oil 
discharges and hazardous 
substance releases 
• Provides access to federal 
resources and technical 
assistance
• Coordinates all federal 
containment, removal, and 
disposal efforts and resources 
during an oil spill or hazardous 
material release
• Coordinates, monitors, and 
directs response efforts, 
including responsible party
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MISS IONS  DUR ING D ISASTER  RESPONSE
S a v i n g  l i v e s  i n  d i s t r e s s  
a n d  e n s u r i n g t h e  s a f e t y  
a n d  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  o f  U S C G  
f o r c e s  a n d  a s s e t s
S e c u r i t y  a n d  
r e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f  p o r t s ,  
w a t e r w a y s ,  a n d  c r i t i c a l  
m a r i t i m e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
S u p p o r t t o  o t h e r  
a g e n c i e s  i n  a  w h o l e  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t  r e s p o n s e  
e f f o r t
E n v i r o n m e n t a l r e s p o n s e  
o p e r a t i o n s  ( o i l ,  c h e m i c a l  
a n d  H A Z M A T )
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Preparedness
Internal
• Heavy Weather/Disaster Plans
• Exercises (local and District)
• Personnel and equipment preps
• Pre-stage
External
• Area Contingency Plan
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National Response System
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NRF & NCP 
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NRS Assets
On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs)
Coordinate all containment, removal, and disposal 
efforts/resources.
Other NRS components
– National Response Center





– Joint Response Teams with neighboring countries
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Responsibilities and Organization
National Response Team (NRT)
The NRT is responsible for national response and preparedness 
planning, for coordinating regional planning, and for providing 
policy guidance and support to the RRTs
40CFR300.105 (c) (1)
13 Regional Response Teams (RRTs)
The RRTs are responsible for regional planning and preparedness 
activities before response actions, and for providing advice and 
support to the OSC or RPM when activated during a response.
40CFR300.105 (c) (2)
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. § 552
NRT Mission 
To provide technical assistance, resources and 
coordination on preparedness, planning, response and 
recovery activities for emergencies involving hazardous 
substances, pollutants and contaminants, hazmat, oil, 
weapons of mass destruction in natural and technological 
disasters and other environmental nationally significant 
incidents.
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Activating the National Response Team
• The NRT should be activated as an emergency 
response team when:
– Oil or HAZMAT discharge exceeds the capability of 
the Region in which it occurs;
– Transects National Boundaries;
– The threat to public health, property, or natural 
resources is substantial
[Reference:  40CFR300.110 (j)]
**The NRT may also be activated to support an ESF-10 
response, even if the three previous criteria have not 
been met
8
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INC IDENT  T IMEL INE
R E S P O N S E
R E C O V E R Y
P R E - I N C I D E N T
I N C I D E N T
P O T U S  a p p r o v e s  E M E R G E N C Y  D E C L A R A T I O N
P r e - s t a g e  r e s o u r c e s  t h r o u g h  S U R G E  A C C O U N T
N A T I O N A L / R E G I O N A L  R E S P O N S E  C O O R D I N A T I O N  C E N T E R  a c t i v a t e d
P O T U S  a p p r o v e s  M A J O R  D I S A S T E R  D E C L A R A T I O N
J O I N T  F I E L D  O F F I C E  e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  a s s u m e s  o n  s c e n e  
I n c i d e n t  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  S u p p o r t
N A T I O N A L / R E G I O N A L  R E S P O N S E  C O O R D I N A T I O N  C E N T E R  d e a c t i v a t e d
[ N A T I O N A L / R E G I O N A L ]  I N C I D E N T  M A N A G E M E N T  A S S I S T  T E A M
a r r i v e s  o n  s c e n e
M I S S I O N  A S S I G N M E N T S  i s s u e d  t o / e x e c u t e d  b y  F e d e r a l  A g e n c i e s
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EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
E S F  1 T R A N S P O R T A T I O N
E S F  2 C O M M U N I C A T I O N S
E S F  3 P U B L I C  W O R K S  A N D  E N G I N E E R I N G
E S F 4 F I R E F I G H T I N G
E S F  5 I N F O R M A T I O N  A N D  P L A N N I N G
E S F  6 M A S S  C A R E ,  E M E R G E N C Y  A S S I S T A N C E ,  
T E M P O R A R Y H O U S I N G ,  A N D  H U M A N  S E R V I C E S
E S F  7 L O G I S T I C S
E S F  8 P U B L I C  H E A L T H  A N D  M E D I C A L  S E R V I C E S
E S F  9 S E A R C H  A N D  R E S C U E
E S F  1 0 O I L  A N D  H A Z A R D O U S  M A T E R I A L S  
R E S P O N S E
E S F  1 1 A G R I C U L T U R E A N D  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S
E S F  1 2 E N E R G Y
E S F  1 3 P U B L I C  S A F E T Y  A N D  S E C U R I T Y
E S F  1 5 E X T E R N A L A F F A I R S
P R I M A R Y  A G E N C Y
P R I M A R Y  A G E N C Y
S U P P O R T I N G  A G E N C Y
S U P P O R T I N G  A G E N C Y
S U P P O R T I N G  A G E N C Y
S U P P O R T I N G  A G E N C Y
S U P P O R T I N G  A G E N C Y
16
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ESF 1 ESF 9 ESF 10
CG
LNO
JOINT FIELD OFFICE (JFO)
STATE/TERRITORY EMERGENCY 
OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)
DHS NATIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER (NOC)




















CG PACAREA REGIONAL RESPONSE 
COORDINATION CENTER (RRCC)
• Region I (Boston, MA)
• Region II (New York, NY)
• Region III (Philadelphia, PA)
• Region IV (Atlanta, GA)
• Region V (Chicago, IL)
• Region VI (Denton, TX)
• Region VII (Kansas City, MO)
• Region VIII (Denver, CO)
• Region IX (Oakland, CA)
• Region X (Seattle, WA)
NRF  COORD INAT ING STRUCTURES
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S I TUAT IONAL  AWARENESS
CG LNO (NRCS)
COMDT (CG-CPE)




Manage all CG situational 
awareness and reporting
Coordinate CG participation 
in meetings
Facilitate Requests For 
Information
ESF 1 – TRANSPORTATION
COMDT (CG-FAC)
ESF 9 – SEARCH AND 
RESCUE
COMDT (CG-SAR)
ESF 10 – OIL/HAZMAT 
RESPONSE OPERATIONS
COMDT (CG-MER)
Coordinate with CGHQ 
program offices
Leverage internal network 
to produce more detailed 
situation reporting
Coordinate with NRCC 
Logistics to determine (and 
anticipate) resource needs
Facilitate requests for CG 
resources
Coordinate closely with CG 
LNO
10
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Response Management
Key points:
• EPA and USCG coordinate and direct the response, EPA for inland areas, 
USCG for the coastal zone.
• Other federal agencies with appropriate jurisdiction and expertise support the 
lead agency.
• Activities are done in partnership with state and local officials.
• Industry is responsible for being prepared for, responding to, and paying for 
cleanup and damages from pollution incidents when they are designated the 
PRP.   Additionally, industry may work with the government as an 
OSRO/Contractor.
• The NRS uses the National Incident Management System/Incident Command 
System to bring these parties together to manage response actions.
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Coast Guard National Strike Force 
• National Oil & Chemical Response Capability
• Support On-Scene Coordinators, Other Agency   
Incident & Combatant Commanders
− National Strike Force Coordination Center
− Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf Strike Teams
• Reorganization:
− CG Incident Management & Assist Team
− Public Information Assistance Team
2016 Budget: $3.4M
FTE (IMAT & PIAT): 161
Yearly Responses: ~45
11
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Response & Recovery Challenges
21
• Interagency Coordination – NRS, NRF and NRT
• Communications – Ability to rapidly setup comms 
for interagency coordination
• Logistics – Response dependent on logistics, surge 
forces and equipment
• Infrastructure – Critical for survivors & responders
“Critical Needs During a Response Always include 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)”
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Recent Hurricane Lessons Learned
22
• MRO / Flood Response: CG flood response assets such as the Western River Flood 
Punt teams were extensively utilized during Harvey and Irma. Several issues were 
identified relating to the best platform to use, equipment, communications, logistics, 
and qualifications. CG-731 (Boat Forces) convened a workgroup to examine these 
issues.
• Satellite Phones:   Due to limited range of VHF radios, 800 MHz radios, and 
damaged cell phone towers, satellite phones capable of placing and receiving phone 
calls should be utilized.  Verify with the manufacturer that satellite phones are able to 
place/receive phone calls.  Provide IMT with user guide/training for satellite phones.
• IT Support:  A lack of IT support hampered IMT interoperability at the ICP. 
• NOAA SSC:  Confusion arose regarding funding SSCs deployed to Sectors to 
conduct hurricane flood modeling and imagery interpretation because Sectors were 
unsure how to fund the SSC beyond the scope of a pollution response.  
Recommendation: Review existing NOAA-USCG IAA and develop a funding and 
deployment process exclusively for non-pollution-related weather events.
12
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Summary of Lessons Learned:  
• Maximize the use of resources (such as ombudsmen and auxiliary) to enhanced 
alignment with partner agencies’ goals and FEMA-District-Sector coordination 
when deploying EPLOYs, LNOs and AREPs to EOCs.  
• Documented a surge in the use of Flood Punt Teams to conduct urban SAR 
• Provide ESF-10 and Mission Assignment training
• Provide training on use of UAS
• Plan for and execute exercises spanning across multiple Districts and AORs
• Ensure Personnel Support Teams (PSTs) are adequately staffed to manage call 
volume for accountability of CG members and family.  Best Practice: Test 
phone numbers ahead of hurricane season. Recommendation: Create a PST 
App for Smartphones. 
• Leverage External Agencies: The inclusion of the National Hurricane Marine 
Branch in the response yielded valuable tidal and wind information that 
informed key decision-makers during the 2018 hurricane season.  Continual 
engagement pre and post hurricane season will benefit future responses.
Recent Hurricane LL (continued)
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NOAA in the Caribbean
 Mission
 NOAA in the Caribbean (NOAA Carib) is a forum for 
communication, partnership, and user engagement that 
supports the delivery of the agency’s mission in the domestic 
and international Caribbean.
 Goal
 Identify and respond to local and regional challenges, needs, 
and opportunities in the Caribbean region by increasing 
communication and providing a platform that connects 
NOAA, its core partners, and key users in the region.
4/24/2019
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NOAA in the Caribbean
 Guiding Principles
 Share information within NOAA and with external partners regarding 
engagement in the region and the products and services NOAA offers.
 Enhance stakeholder communication with NOAA personnel and access to 
NOAA resources and capabilities.
 Serve as a connecting link between NOAA headquarters and line offices, 
and NOAA activities in the Caribbean region.
 Improve collaboration among NOAA and its regional partners.
 Stress the application of “an integrated NOAA approach”, where NOAA 
employees understand and are knowledgeable about NOAA activities in 
the region, and look for opportunities to provide additional value to 
efforts through integration.
 Facilitate implementation of the NOAA Caribbean Strategy via alignment 
of NOAA Carib activities, protocols, and membership.
National Weather Service
The National Weather Service provides weather, hydrologic, and climate forecasts and 
warnings for the United States, its territories, adjacent waters and ocean areas. 
 Caribbean Tsunami Warning Program (CTWP) – Tsunami and Seismic Data, Educator 
Resources, Student Opportunities 
 The CTWP office supports an increased capability of the tsunami warning system for the 
Caribbean and Adjacent Regions. This includes the observational system (sea level, seismic and 
GPS) and the continued enhancement of tsunami outreach and education capacity, including the 
implementation of the TsunamiReady® (US) and Tsunami Ready (International) Programs. 
Located in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico
 National Hurricane Center (NHC) – Educator and Student Resources, Tours, Hurricane 
Information and Data 
 The mission of the NHC is to save lives, mitigate property loss, and improve economic efficiency 
by issuing the best watches, warnings, forecasts, and analyses of hazardous tropical weather 
and by increasing understanding of these hazards. Located in Miami, FL
4/24/2019
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National Marine Fisheries Service
The NOAA Fisheries Service is dedicated to the stewardship of living marine resources 
through science-based conservation and management, and the promotion of healthy 
ecosystems. They have regional offices and several smaller field offices. 
 Northeast Marine Corridor and Culebra Island Habitat Focus Area
 As part of the Habitat Blueprint administered by the NOAA Fisheries Office of Habitat 
Conservation, NOAA has selected ten Habitat Focus Areas (HFAs), place-based locations 
across the country to maximize the effectiveness of habitat conservation. In Puerto Rico, 
NOAA developed an implementation plan and associated action plans for the The
Northeast Marine Corridor and Culebra Island Habitat Focus Area in Puerto Rico.
 Primary activities are to restore threatened corals, implement watershed restoration 
projects, research fishery and recreational impacts to fragile marine ecosystems, and 
improve the predictions of real-time storm surge, to conserve this area’s coral reefs, 
seagrass beds, mangroves, and the people and animals that depend on them.
National Ocean Service
The National Ocean Service provides data, tools, and services that support coastal 
economies and their contribution to the national economy. 
 National Estuarine Research Reserve System – Field Trips, Professional 
Development, Educator Resources 
 The National Estuarine Research Reserves System protects more than 1.3 million coastal 
and estuarine acres in 28 reserves located in 22 states and Puerto Rico for purposes of 
long-term research, environmental monitoring, education and stewardship. Jobos Bay
Reserve 
 Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) – Curriculum, Real World Data, and 
Multimedia 
 The Caribbean Coastal Ocean Observing System (CariCOOS) operates a network of 
observing assets including data buoys, coastal meteorological stations, vessels, 
instruments and radars. Data from these assets and value-added data products such as 
graphs and maps are provided free of charge to the general public on their website. 
4/24/2019
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National Environmental Satellite, 
Data, and Information Service
NESDIS provides secure and timely access to global environmental data and 
information from satellites and other sources to promote and protect the Nation's 
security, environment, economy, and quality of life.
 Caribbean Atmospheric Research Center (“Atmos Carib”) – Satellite Data, 
Forecasts, Local Climatology 
 Atmos Carib is affiliated with the National Climate Data Center and aims to offer the 
most comprehensive weather and climate information for the Caribbean Region. 
Located in Mayagüez, PR 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Research
NOAA Research provides the research foundation for understanding the complex 
systems that support our planet. 
 Sea Grant is a nationwide network of 32 university-based programs that 
conduct scientific research, education, training, and extension projects 
designed to foster science-based decisions about the use and conservation of 
our aquatic resources. 
4/25/2019
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NOAA Regional Preparedness 
Training (NRPT) Workshop
San Juan, PR














































Office of Response and Restoration
Our Mission and Mandates
To provide world-class science and information-
based solutions to protect and restore the nation’s 





A bit of history…
Origins of NOAA “HAZMAT” Program…
1970 NOAA Created
1976 Argo Merchant oil spill, 
Nantucket, MA
1977 – Special Force in the NCP
Scientific Support to FOSC
Scientific Support Coordinators
NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration (OR&R)
“We have been part of the science of oil and chemical spills for a very 
long time.” 
Annually, OR&R…
•provides 24/7 support for emergency response support.
•responds to 120-170 oil & chemical spills.
• trains more than 2000 emergency responders and 
planners.
•supports over 40 spill drills with the U.S. Coast Guard and 
other agencies.
•settles 4-7 natural resource damage assessment cases & 
works on over 200 additional cases.
•supports removal of hundreds of tons of marine debris.
•develops new tools & conducts research to address hazards 
on the water and prevent marine debris.
•…and respond to disasters.
(small program office, big job) 10
4/25/2019
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The origins of the NOAA GOM Disaster Response Center 
started with a storm in the Gulf of Mexico…
Disaster Response Program




Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response Center (DRC)
All-Hazards Preparedness Mission
Disaster Preparedness Program
18,700 sq-ft hardened complex (up to cat. 5) 
Dedicated on 15 Oct. 2012 – Supporting Hurricane Isaac the Next Day 













Provide the essential support, guidance,
and tools to the whole community,
including Federal, Commonwealth,
Municipal, Private Sectors, and NGO
partners to build upon, restore and
strengthen their capability and capacity
as entities and individuals to be prepared
and able to perform their essential
functions effectively, efficiently, and




PARTNERS AND RESILIENCE PROGRAMS
COR3 - Partners in the Resilience:
• Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency 
Bureau
• Puerto Rico Planning Board
• 78 Local Emergency Management Offices
• Local Government Agencies
• Other Federal Agencies
• Non Governmental Organizations
Recovery / Resilience Partners
Units / Programs
• Community Resiliency / Preparedness
• Continuity of Operations
• Training & Exercise
• Mass Care
• Hazard Mitigation Community and Education 
Outreach
• Hazard Mitigation Community Planning
• Community Planning Capacity Building - RSF
Recovering on a different perspective.  A Better preparedness will support a faster recovery
Innovations
INNOVATIONS
• PR-IMT National Qualification System (MOA).
• Lifeline State Integration
• Youth Preparedness Council.
• Core Advisory Groups.
• Multisectoral Disaster Feeding Plan
• Business EOC.
• Reverse Engineering on Soft Projects.
• Technical Assistance for Partners.
• Hazard Mitigation Planning
• Municipal and Regional Baseline Assessments.
• Preparedness & Mitigation Curriculum for Schools
• Relaunch of CERT (Community Approach & Schools).
• PR Agency COOP Plans and EOPs
• Community Preparedness Outreach
4/24/2019
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 Provide EPA personnel to the FEMA RRCC and NRCC,
JFOs, the EPA REOC, PR and VI EOCs and other
coordination venues to support FEMA response
operations in PR and the USVI.
 Removal, cleanup and disposal of oil & hazmat; collect
and disposal of HHW; monitor immediate threats to
public H&S and the environment in both PR and VI.
 Coordinate/Execute all necessary assessments,
evaluations, sampling and analytical services/support to
ensure the safety and quality of drinking water &
wastewater systems in PR.
 Conduct Drinking Water Sampling Across the USVI.
 Repair of Ambient Air Monitoring Stations in PR.














U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Puerto Rico Branches
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
3
Strategies for Collection







U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region II







Lessons learned from Hurricanes Irma and Maria:
FEMA NCR RSF (2017-2019) 
Ernesto L. Díaz
NRPT 2019  ·  San Juan, PR 
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• Hurricanes Irma and María (Sep 2017) …Not prepared for Cat 4 or 5!
• Major Disaster declaration and response under FEMA ESF10-
Request for Mission Assignments:
-RRF Sunken vessels removal (USCG)
-RRF Coastal, Nearshore and Beach Debris Removal (USACE) 
• DNER requests FEMA Natural and Cultural Resources Sector to 
conduct
Damage Assessments and support to develop COA for Coral Reefs, 
Seagrasses, Beaches, Dunes and Wetlands.
• DNER requests: Corals as eligible facility for Public Assistance: 
Critical Maintained Natural Infrastructure (Our Ask and the Evidence)




Puerto Rico’s coastal uses and assets
3
ECONOMICS
GDP: $105 billion/year (PRPB2016)
Tourism $2B/year
Built up Areas/Coastline  24%
Industrial Parks (81)
Commercial/Recreational Fisheries






Protected Areas (Land) DRNA 8.7% (2015) – CLCC 16% (2016)
Protected Areas (Marine) 27.2%
Shallow coral reefs and associated communities designated for 
protection 49%
Historical Properties (22+)
Coastal population:  2.3 million (61%) at
44 coastal municipalities
Territorial waters:  9 nm   (A=5,078.9 mi2) 
Coastline:   799 mi / 1,225 beaches (60% 
moderate to severe erosion)




Miles of Primary Roads (17,387mi/27,982km
Coastal population:  2.3 million (61%) at 44
coastal municipalities
Territorial waters:  9 nm   (A=5,078.9 mi2) 
Coastline:   799 mi / 1,225 beaches (60% 
moderate to severe erosion)






COMMUNICATIONS Fiber Optic Cables (15)
Internet Infrastructure
Public comms systems
ENERGY Power plant systems (7; 5 public, 2 private)
Substations
Distribution and transmission lines














Hurricane Irma 06 SEP 2017



















>220 papers on coral reefs wave attenuation reviewed
4/24/2019
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Brendan Bane 2014 13





DNER/FEMA Coral Reef Systems
FEMA requests: Investment Documentation
Data repository for sharing16
4/24/2019
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• Must prepare for the next one.
• Build back and retrofit stronger and resilient.
• Corals and natural infrastructure must also be restored to 










Coordinate all the resources of the government and the
private sector, to provide the fastest and most effective
services before, during and after emergency situations to
ensure the protection of life and property of citizens.
4/24/2019
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Hurricane Maria – September 20th, 
2017
• Was a category 4 hurricane and 
could be reclassified to category 5.
• $ 3,919,899,824.36 - Total Public 
Assistance Grants 
• $ 1,226,870.001.79- Total in 
Individuals and Household Program
• 463,752 applications approved for 
the Individual Assistance Program 
Foto: NOAA
• The 78	municipalities of Puerto 
Rico were designated under the 
Public Assistance and Individual 
Assistance Programs.





• More than 70,000 houses lost their
roofs. 
• Total collapse of essential services. 
• 64 direct deaths caused by the
hurricane. 
• 2,975 deaths related to the hurricane, 
according to a study conducted by
the University of George Washington 
PREPA
















Foto: NMEAD Foto: El Nuevo Día
Aibonito












Changes in Emergency Operational 
Plans
• The Emergency Operational Plans of the government agencies and 
municipalities were worked from scratch to bring them to a catastrophic 
level and temper them to the reality faced after the passage of Hurricane 
Maria. 
• Before the passage of the phenomenon by Puerto Rico, the plans were 
prepared for the scenario of a category one hurricane (1). 
• Uniform systems of plans, training and exercises are developed. 





• Important changes were made to the Supply Distribution Plan to ensure 
that citizens receive them  fast, safely and orderly.
• As part of these efforts, in conjunction with the Department of Housing, 
over 20,000 cots were distributed to be located in the shelters of the 
municipalities. 
• One of the priorities of the Bureau has been to deliver supplies to the 78 
municipalities so that, in the event of an emergency or disaster, they can 
meet the needs of citizens.
Warehouses
• Historically, Puerto Rico has depended on the supplies provided by FEMA that
have warehouses located on the Island.
• To meet the need of Puerto Rico, the Bureau acquired two warehouses, located
in Guaynabo and Ponce where water and food supplies are maintained, as well
as emergency response equipment and basic necessities.





• In order to guarantee communication between the response agencies 
during emergencies, we are installing satellite communication systems in 
all Police Commanders, Fire Stations, Ambulance Dispatches, Emergency 
Management Bureau regions, as well as the Emergency Operations 
Centers (COE) of the 78 municipalities. 
• In addition, radios of 100 watts are being installed in the facilities, as well 
as in more than 300 hospital institutions around the Island. 
• These radios go from one antenna to another, without the need for a 




Alliance with the Private Sector
Alliance with the Private Sector
• For the first time, representatives of private companies have a space in the 
Emergency Operations Center (COE), to work together with the 
government and respond to the needs of citizens. 
• Among the sectors that are present in the COE are: manufacturing, food, 





















• Strong coastal earthquake 
shaking
• Rapid sea level changes 
• Roaring sound
Official Information 
• Federal, State, Local govt
• Important for distant tsunamis
Informal Information
• Friends, neighbors, relatives




Drop, Cover, and Hold.
Go Inland to High Ground Immediately.







1946, Hilo, USA 1995, Mexico





• TWCs are reliable and dependable; 24x7
• Monitor seismicity for large earthquakes
• Monitor sea levels for tsunamis
• When alarms trigger, evaluate earthquake 
for tsunami threat







































































































































Ejemplos de productos de los TWC: Terremoto en
PR/VI o el Caribe, Peligro Potencial de Tsunami
Transcurrido Producto Descripción
00:00 Terremoto Ocurre terremoto local, Mw ≥ 7.1
00:03 ObservatoryMessage*
Parámetros del terremoto preliminares y revisados por
PTWC – Activa entrada en el CISN 





Pronóstico de tsunami basado en el mecanismo del
terremoto y la data de nivel del mar. Mantiene, 
actualiza o degrada el nivel apropiado de Alerta o 
genera una cancelación.








Mensaje complementario con lecturas de nivel del mar de
mareógrafos costeros cercanos o DARTS. Cambio en nivel de 






Mensaje complementario con lecturas del nivel del mar de
mareógrafos cercanos costeros o DARTS Cambio en nivel de 































































• Information flow is linear from one 
source





























How People Get Warnings: Reality


















































































































CHALLENGES FROM SEVERE 




















In order to response in a proper
way and inform the community
of the hazard or the possibility
of one so they can be prepare
and take the necessary actions
to save lifes
We use different official sources and elements to
collet information and to get it to the public as
fast as we can and necessary
4/25/2019
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We are in contact all  the time 
with the NWS via phones, radio 
and personal to our EOC if 
need it 
We are in contact and follow the
information from the National
Hurricane Center in Florida
We recive information from the PTWS,
PRSN and the NTWC, also the NWS
We use the ENWIN System, internet




Once confirm de source of information, We
deliver the alert messages to everyone
concern: Regions or Zones, Municipalities,
responds Agencies, using different forms of
communications as: IPOW, regular radios,
p-25 interoperability's radios, 100w radios,
internet, phones and the media, included
commercial TV and radio stations
This alert information could 
be just up date information, 
watching awareness or a 
warning alert for a Tsunami 




At the same time we will active the State
EOC and all the components of every EFS to
give the support need it at the field
Basically the key and critical point handling this 
phenomes is the risk to loose the communication 
before, in the middle or after the emergency 
happened, so you can not give the coordination 
and help to the communities that you suppose to 
offer and they need    
4/25/2019
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We must educate the
communities, other responders,
agencies, work together and be
prepare and ready to anything
and everything in order to
accomplish our mission with















































to put everyone on 






Mission Response Yes (depends on education) ALL 
Sources of 
Information 















Needs to be 
prepared before 





















































































options, total loss 
of communication 
can happen, ham 













Lack of plans 
for an event 
of this 
magnitude  
Need to plan, 
practice, train for 
worst case 
scenarios 
























Response plans exist  




Plans existed, not 
updated, not used, 
systems not adequate, 
did not reflect current 
codes and standards 
Mission 






Land Use Plan 
We must enforce 
sensible use of land use 
plan and zoning; assess 
on paper but in reality is 
different (i.e., zoning) 
Building again in high-
hazard area (i.e., schools, 
hospital, NWS) 
Recovery 

















shift) = in response 
to communities 










ALL (pre, during, 
post) yes, indirectly ALL 
  
Communicate the severity 
danger/risk 
Because of the size of 
the island, confidence in 
the forecast/warning; 
people get desensitized 
with many hurricanes 
missing Puerto Rico; so 
many warnings with 
nothing happening, 
people choose not to 
respond 
Having public understand 
the risk; people think 









timeframe NOAA yes   Yes - all 
Simultaneous hazard events 
may require unknown 
flexibility 
Need tabletop exercises 
that are more complex, 
multi-scenario, some 
scenarios require staff 
safety ahead of 
protocols, need 
redundancy 
There is a plan for NWS 
for continuity, but has 
not been exercised 
Mission 
Response NOAA yes Yes - all 
Capacity for multiple, 
simultaneous disasters 
Climate change could 






resources. Turnover of 
political/experienced/bur




Marine/land debris hindered 




See Florida plans for an 
example 
Mission 
Response   no All 
Rapid assessments of 
damage/debris were critical 
Areas that had quick 
assessments made it 
easier to scope federal 
funding   
Mission 
Response   no All 
Don't restructure the 
organization during a 
disaster* 
Building a new type of 
structure during a 
disaster leads to added 
pressure, lack of 
Sectors and grant 
manager introduced part 
way during a disaster 










Policy guidelines need to be 
revisited due to change and 
new technology, climate 
change etc.* 
Policies need to be 
revised before an 
incident 
E.g., coral reef and green 
technologies 
Timeframe




PAPPG no federal 
Police evacuated people in 




knocking, whats app) 
repeat weather 
messages 
Build relationships prior, 
build trust, work 
together 
Mission 
Response All yes All 
Deadlines need to be flexible, 
but… 
FEMA extends 
deadlines. Are these 
good or bad? False 
expectations. Inefficient 
timeframe Repairs and legislation         
Be broad and bold on initial 
assessments 




Puerto Rico initial RSF 
was broad and created 
opportunity for recovery Both  All no All 
Lack of pre-scripted mission 
assignments/Duplicity of 
efforts* 
The more pre-scripted 
mission assignments, 





agencies           
Other Federal Agencies 
(OFAs) need to be assertive in 
their supplemental funding 
request* You snooze, you lose 
There are some things 
FEMA cannot fund         
Community response efforts. 
Develop a community plan. 
Community members 
segregating debris; 
reaching out to the 
elderly; local 
communities will 
engage if given the 
opportunity, they take 




sufficiency and help 
others.  Opportunity to 
teach young people. 
Resiliency          
**Bolding indicates priority items 
































barriers Pre-disaster   Yes All 
Communication 
Back to basics- simple 







infrastructur During, Post-disaster   Yes All 
e will be 
available in 




Interpersonal- layers of 
bureaucracy slowed 
progress 
Need to identify an 












getting in the 
way of 
progress During     
Commonwealth and 
local 
High turnover rate of 
response positions 
Need to maintain and 
document experiences, 
and put them into 
practice. Done through 






the cracks.  
Use authority 
(knowledge 
of who has it) Pre-,Post- disaster     
Commonwealth and 
local 
Did not pre-emptively 
involve private sector 
Involve private sector 
during contingency 
plans.  Make the link 

















Release of emergency 




streamline that (e.g., 
turn off taxation during 
response.) 
E.g., tax and 
revenue 
process/polit
ical fix During     All 
Getting assets to 
people  
Use multiple avenues 
to distribute resources 
(e.g., NGOs, faith based 
& private) 




supply chain) During, Post-disaster     
Commonwealth and 
local 
Getting community to 





of information & 
informing communities 

























Pre-planning on how to 
get resources to the 
island, and distributing 









need to be 


























to be simple and 
tailored to community 
Lacked proper 
terminology to inform 
community 
Recovery 




category  4 or 5 
hurricane 
Should prepare 




the island gave a false 
sense of security & 
resources were moved 
to VI to deal with 
Hurricane Irma Preparation   Yes All 
Communities 
relying on social 
media and not 
official sources of 
information 
More outreach about 
what official sources of 
information are 
Lack of exposure to 
official sources, too 
much exposure to other 






created with central 
point of information 
Starting from family, 
community, local, 





Need more than every-
day, standard 
communication 
 E.g., radio, paper map, 




t of residential 
building codes 
More damage and loss 
of life due to unsafe 
structures 
Building codes not 
enforced, and people did 
not understand homes 









Don't wait until 
hospital is impacted to 
make 
decisions/hospital 
need redundant or 
back up energy 
sources 
Disabled/sick/elderly 
people were stuck in 





Access to clean 
water Ran out of water 
There was no redundant 
water for residents/no 









Necessary aid could 
not be distributed/get 
to local communities 
quick enough 
San Juan is major port 
for food/resources 
coming to PR. Other 
ports are used for 
petroleum products, 









withstand hurricanes Roads, power lines, etc. Preparation 
infrastructure


































Map communities & identify 
liaisons, focus groups to 
identify effective 
language/terminology, science 
communication training for 
personnel in agencies 1. 
Database of community needs 
based on geography, 
demographics, resiliency center 
possibilities, existing 
infrastructure  2.Establishing 













on social media and 
not official sources 
of information 











Local gov support of NWS, 
teach resource quality, 
scientists create "internet 
image", before season: sit 
down with forecast 
communicators, consider 
certifications, spend time with 
communities to ensure 
understanding of maps / skills 
at community level to ID 
official sources. 1. create 
official emergency 
website/social media and 
promote/market it as a user 
friendly resource (2) link back 
to authoritative sources NWS  
No TV 
personaliti





NWS is less 
entertainin
g and has 
to follow 
protocols 








think they are 
lucky, manage 
expectations, 




Because of the 















not to respond.  
Take culture 
"remember Maria", continuous 
outreach to remind (e.g. 
poster), probability concept, 
Message: "You control your 


















Ran out of 
water 
Promote/fix policy for 
rainwater capture, investigate/ 
revise rainwater capture policy 
(resiliency center example), 
community workshops on virus 
protection fitting into cultural 
norms (list of best practices). 1. 
Reduce barriers to 
home/commercial rainwater 
capturing     2. encourage 
rainwater collection/capture 
with safe treatment  
    
  Poorly maintained infrastructure 
E.g., failure of 
infrastructure 
(water); waiting 









Enforce construction code, 
certified inspectors, education 
for empowerment in 
maintenance solidarity training. 
1. Informal contractor training 
2. use best 
construction/maintenance 
practices from other hurricane/ 



























staff.  Don't 
restructure the 
organization 
during a disaster  
Climate change 














management schools, Local 
level leader training. 1. develop 
curriculum from vocational 
schools to higher learning 
institutions 
No change   
Logistics 
Port accessibility is 
limited during 
response because of 
existing laws 
San Juan is 
major port for 
food/resources 
coming to PR. 
Other ports are 
used for 
petroleum 
products, coal.   
Necessary aid 










(e.g., turn off 
taxation during 
response.) 
Laws impeding maritime 
supplies should be temporarily 
waived (Jones Act) for 
appropriate timeframe (or 
permanently). 1. neutral study 
on PR relevant Jones Act issues 






Policy Land use plan 





sensible use of 
land use plan 
and zoning; 
assess on paper 
but in reality is 
different (i.e., 
zoning) 
Enforce code, consistency in 
code, implement new code. 1. 
approve new land use 
regulations with strong focus 
on risk zones 




Categories 4 or 5 
hurricanes 
Prior close calls 
gave a false 
sense of security 
& resources 
were moved to 





Education / outreach, use 
Maria as an example while 
fresh in memories,                  
For Tsunami:  prepare models 
and videos of what it would 
look like (overlay culturally 
significant places), storm surge 
water marks / signage (Keep 
reminders of physical damage), 





































Table top exercise to improve 
plan, use available funding and 
follow through, involve local 
level.  creative solutions like 
addressing faith based orgs), 
capitalizing on existing program 
infrastructure, community 
leaders, create plans in daily 













































Be aware of language and 
culture needs. Post flyers. 
Centralized information in 
public location. Verifying 
the community leaders. 
Pre-training at the 
community level. Both 
What to do if 
community is 
totally isolated and 




need to be 
revisited due to 
change and new 
technology, 

















agreement on existing 
FEMA public assistance, 
mitigation and recovery 
policies. Both 





need to be 







you snooze, you 
lose 
Use consistent vocabulary. 
Agencies should be 






the local emergency 
coordinators along with the 
state and mayors at annual 
meeting for training (not 
limited to local 
authority).Training of 




This might be 






Categories 4 or 5 
hurricanes 
Prior close 
calls gave a 









Social scientists may be 
able to help with effective, 
engaged outreach. 
Education and buy-in from 
local community leaders. 
More effective exercises 
esp. on the items we did 
wrong previously (i.e., 
AAR). Don't let AAR sit on a 
shelf; reassess. Develop a 




were critical. Be 
bold on initial 





ties that had 
quick 
assessments 
made it easier 
to scope federal 
funding 
Centralized application to 
collect assessment 
information multiple 
sectors. The public can 
report on their 
municipalities. Both 
 This goes beyond 
just FEMA. Post 
and report storm 
information i.e., 
#hurricanemaria 
(include GPS). Post 
-Tsunami survey 
guide is available. 
Language and 
culture must be 
taken into 
consideration. 
Inequity  Vulnerable population Disabled/sick/
elderly people 
were stuck in 
place 







back up energy 




























to be simple and 
tailored to community 
Use of short wave 
















Need more than 
standard 
communication (e.g., 
radio, paper map, ham 
radio) 
Need of education on 
the technology used 
(be outside, pay fees 
for services), need 
power for sat phone, 
UHF, PA systems, use 
phones as 
communication with 
low wattage , solar 







can't fund all 
of it 




local, regional.  
Local level 
preparedness plan 
created with central 
point of information.  
Need accountability 
w.r.t. response plans.  
Pre-emergency 
planning to include 
local law enforcement 
and impartial parties 
(e.g., NGO, faith based 
organizations) 
Aggressive on pre plan- 
what is already there, 
educate the 
community, what 
should they do with 
supplies (have it ready 
before the event- bag 
of supplies, food, 
water, communication 
tools, etc.), have to 










etc.)   
Response 
Rapid assessments of 
damage/debris were 
critical. Be bold on 





Areas that had quick 
assessments made it 
easier to scope federal 
funding 
Require prior base line, 
municipalities needed, 
pre plan for what we 
need to do (before and 
after),   takes time for 
some response (why 
preparedness is so 
important), be able to 
grow food, apply for 




both   
Inequity  Vulnerable population Disabled/sick/elderly people 
were stuck in 
place 
Don't wait until 
hospital is impacted to 
make 
decisions/hospital need 
redundant or back up 
energy sources 
 Better assessment of 





































1. Take information to 
community, and ask for 
feedback. 2. Which sources of 
social media are used? 3. 
Investigate which app are 
applicable to community, and 
use contact point to distribute 
information 4. pick a central 
location/focal point to 
distribute information and time 





relying on social 













official sources of 
information are 
1. do community outreach on 
official sources of information, 



















Need more than 
standard 
communication 
(e.g., radio, paper 
map, ham radio) 
1. Encourage folks to get 
amateur/ham radio license. 2. 
preposition sat phones, work 
with technology companies to 


























Because of the 
size of the island, 










choose not to 






1. Show damage from previous 
storms, and consistent 
messaging each season. 2. less 
emotion when messaging, keep 
message calm to prepare 
rather than scare community 
same for 
both   
Infrastructure 











More damage and 
loss of life due to 
unsafe structures 
1. Messaging related to 
maintaining a safe structure, 
not exclusively collecting 
water. 2. Critical infrastructure 
should be evaluated 3. Properly 
use federal funds to repair and 






assessment of curriculum in all 
academic settings 





cisterns  Ran out of water 
1. Education on rainwater 
harvesting, the importance of 
it. 2. Improve residential water 
collection to maintain a 
reserve. 3 education on low 
cost filters (e.g., sand). 4. 
Education on maintenance of 
individual water sources. 5. 
proper installation of 
tanks/cisterns 
same for 
both   
Logistics 
Port accessibility 




San Juan is 
major port for 
food/resource
s coming to 
PR. Other 
ports are used 
for petroleum 
products, 
coal.   
Necessary aid 









(e.g., turn off 
taxation during 
response.) 
1. Landside facilities are geared 
toward handling only one type 
of commodity, 2. Require 
private ports to be capable, 
and ready to act in the case of 
a disaster. 3. identify alternate 
airports/transportation that 






















1. Having a plan for where to 
put marine debris, 2. Destroyed 
buildings/construction 
materials, 3. identify final 
location for debris (e.g., landfill 
























include local law 
enforcement and 
impartial parties 
(e.g., NGO, faith 
based 
organizations) 
1. Re-institute CERT program in 
schools, churches, 
communities, 2. Use in 
coordination with 
neighborhood watch programs, 
3. use "nextdoor" type apps,  
same for 
















1. Do more outreach with 
state/territory/govt level to 
educate about what they can 
ask for in terms of mission 
assignments 2. looking back at 
historical lessons, to drive 
assessments  
same for 
both   
Inequity  Vulnerable population Disabled/sick/
elderly people 
were stuck in 
place 
Don't wait until 
hospital is 
impacted to make 
decisions/hospital 
need redundant 
or back up energy 
sources 
1. Census data/demographic 
data to focus efforts and 
identified during emergency 
preparedness planning to 
create a special needs plan. 2. 
Compliance checks done in low 







Time of day 
may influence 
who is 





improvements rather than 
fines. 4. Messages tailored to 
underserved communities.  
available 
during the day 
vs. night. 

































existing data (private 
and public), (identify 
orgs already doing work 
in community)       1b.  
Visiting communities to 
document needs and 
points of contact (2) 
2.5 
Academia, NGOs, 
Community based orgs 
with established 
gov/commonwealth/ter
ritory partnership for 
information sharing 
Communities 
relying on social 













official sources of 
information are 
1. team (graphic artist,
website builder, science 
communication expert, 
marketing specialist, 
social media expert) 1 
PREMA & VITEMA, 
academia or other 
private partners at local 
level 










2.educate on proper 
use of water catchment 









































Create courses and 
certifications, mandate 
training. Build cat 4&5 
rated buildings and 
implement best 
















































development (at all 
levels) 
2.5 


















coal.   
Necessary aid 










(e.g., turn off 
taxation during 
response.) 
1. conduct study and 
analyze potential 
impacts of change 
Study=1             
Change = 5 
Academia, think-tank 








use of land use 
plan and zoning; 
assess on paper 
but in reality is 
different (i.e., 
zoning) 
1. Meet with risk 
experts and planning 
board to ensure best 
practices   4 








Categories 4 or 5 
hurricanes 
Prior close 
calls gave a 










award competitions for 
campaign, education 
outreach all ages 
involved. Conduct for 
both hurricane and 
tsunamis at schools, 














plan created with 








include local law 
enforcement and 
impartial parties 
(e.g., NGO, faith 
based 
organizations) 
project based learning 
platforms, find and edit 
existing checklists that 
can be PR relevant and 
distribute, emulate 

































communication needs to 




















to be revisited 
















These policies need to be 
revised before an 
incident 
GAO-focus group. 
Agency feedback to 
GAO and FEMA. 
Agencies/academia 
provide information 
on how green 
infrastructure fits 


















fund You snooze, you lose 
Interagency training 
on procedures of 
funding 
opportunities. Create 
a survey (to 
commonwealth 












requests relative to 
their mandates.  
Federal agencies 
should be prepared 





th is unique in 
that funding 
budget does 
not allow for  
Congress for 
supplemental 







Categories 4 or 
5 hurricanes 
Prior close 
calls gave a 




to VI to deal 
with Irma 
Should prepare 
regardless of category 
level 
Social science (this is 
not a technical 
problem) how we 






Storm Ready. Expand 
CERT to include 
specific training to 
community (i.e., 









The more pre-scripted 
mission assignments, the 
quicker response 
activities can commence 




what they have 
currently.  Agencies 
develop new ones as 
appropriate. Conduct 
exercise to review 
and update PSMAs. 




state and local 
the state to use to 
make requests. 





were critical. Be 








had quick assessments 
made it easier to scope 
federal funding 
Implement #hashtag. 
Field exercise like 
CARIBEWAVE. 
Develop app (see 
SERT-FL). 



































needs to be 
simple and 
tailored to 





















 Training and education, map of who is 
able to educate. Being able to buy, use, 


















People need to know their jobs 
(checklist), communication to avoid 
different decisions being made, held 
accountable by making sure people 
report problems (investigation), teams 
of public oversight to help. This might 
not help everyone but it could in the 
future. Turn over the information to 
theirs and new leaders (who has that 






























(1) Educate- workshops to build the 
knowledge for the local leaders to bring 
back to their communities (ex. kids can 
take it home to their families), break up 
the workshops into regions to allow 
more people to attend (for different 
cultures), NOAA office for coastal 
management.  (2) Outreach- media 
blitz (ads at the movies, on roads, 
radios, TV stations, at stores), public 
and private classes (home 
improvement stores), youth 
organizations (boy scouts, girl scouts, 
etc.), these need to be on how to 
prepare for these events. (3) Goal is to 













people on the ground in pilot 
communities (more difficult to 






were critical. Be 







Areas that had 
quick 
assessments 
made it easier 
to scope 
federal funding Assessments, inventory, create culture  
4.5 communities, state, and 
municipalitie
s  
Inequity  Vulnerable population Disabled/sick/
elderly people 
were stuck in 
place 







back up energy 



































Be targeted (e.g., agencies 
and groups developing 
message, can plan events 
such as town hall) and 
opportunistic (e.g., if 
community is having an 
event, use the event to share 
information). Use an event 
organized by the community 




ties leaderships (e.g., 




churches).  Official 
message developers 




















official sources of 
information are 
Be targeted (e.g., agencies 
and groups developing 
message, can plan events 
such as town hall) and 
opportunistic (e.g., if 
community is having an 
event, use the event to share 
information). Use an event 
organized by the community 
(especially with food and a 
2.5 
Pre- events -->  same 

















paper map, ham 
radio) 
Connect with university/radio 
clubs.  Identify funding 
source/opportunities. 
Demonstrations to solicit 
interest, go to events and set 
up table.  Stories/outreach 
about why some 
communities were better off 
post disaster because had sat 
phones/ham. Continuing 
education, training 
 5 (technical 
skills and 







commission (FCC), ARRL 
- amateur radio relay 
league, emergency 
management agency, 
amateur radio clubs, 



















Because of the 
size of the island, 
confidence in the 
forecast/warning









not to respond.  





Create traveling exhibit of 
how things went wrong and 
why you should be prepared; 





ties leaderships (e.g., 




churches).  Official 
message developers 


















and loss of life 
due to unsafe 
structures 




municipalities to go around 
communities to identify most 
important aspect of a 
structure. Different source of 
funding for public, private 




FEMA capacity build 
sector;  
Lack of access 




cisterns  Ran out of water 
New construction require 
redundant water systems, 
existing construction improve 
collection systems, create 
document/demonstration for 
rainwater harvesting; low 
cost, implement at a few 
locations within the 
community to encourage 
community members to 
copy. educating about how 




















San Juan is 
major port for 
food/resource
s coming to 
PR. Other 
ports are used 
for petroleum 
products, 
coal.   
Necessary aid 










Have diverse ports, capable 
of handling other goods; 
back-up port for response 
operations. Policy shift by 
port authority by diversifying 
use of port. Contingency 
plans to have more than one 
viable port available.  
5 
port authority, govt of 
PR, private industry 














Identifying locations ahead of 
time in contingency plans,  
1.5-2 FEMA, USCG, local 
agencies, NOAA Marine 








local, regional.  
Local level 
preparedness 
plan created with 








include local law 
enforcement and 
impartial parties 
(e.g., NGO, faith 
based 
organizations) 
Look to VITEMA model to 
replicate, find more avenues 
of socializing information; 
demonstrations in 
communities during events, 
continued community 
outreach. Improve 
consistency of delivery. 
Institutionalizing self-reliance 
(i.e., stop relying on federal 
























keep hazard mitigation plan 
up to date.  educate 
commonwealth about FEMA 
missions to determine what 
can be asked for.  FEMA 
relies on guidance from local 
govt level. Inform what can 
be asked for (e.g., guidance 
document/ lessons learned) 
5 
Commonwealth/local 




(e.g., coastal agencies, 
all-encompassing plan), 
port authorities, 
schools, local chamber 



















plans.  Make the 







Multiple companies get hired 
or one primary contractor 
with sub-contractors. 
Advanced contracting 
initiatives for pre-planned 
contracts. List for potential 
companies available if 
needed pre-,during, post- 
disaster 
sliding scale 
private businesses, local 
govt, contractors 
Inequity Vulnerable population Disabled/sick/
elderly people 
were stuck in 
place 





l need redundant 
or back up 
energy sources 
If municipalities’ emergency 
contingency plans don't exist, 
then develop and identify 
vulnerable population(s).  If 
they do exist, include in 
them. 
5 
census bureau, social 
services, health and 
human services, local 







































































































































1. Familiarization with Tsunami Warning Center products and
timelines
2. Improve the communication of the threat message in
PR/USVI by official TWFP and social influencers.
3. Will focus on four stages of warning:






• Comms based on natural signs (Activity 1 – 30 min)
• Comms with Message #1 (Activity 2 – 30 min)
• Comms with Message # 3 (Activity 3 – 30 min)
• Comms with Message # 8 (Activity 4 – 30 min)











• Strong earthquake shaking is felt, 11:00 PM  
• Some buildings have collapsed.
• Phones lines are immediately jammed as 
everyone tries to find out what happened.
• No TWC messages have been issued yet.
Scenario Activity 1 Questions
Including earthquake, you have 3 minutes for 
action (all individual), 20 minutes group 
discussion
1. How do you respond to the earthquake?
2. What do you think is going to happen, number the risks.
3. What can you communicate, to Who and How are you 
going to do it.
Tsunami Warning Focal Point respond as Tsunami 
Warning Focal Point, USCG as USCG others as a social 
influencer
• Time 11:03
• PTWC message #1 issued
• Telephones are jammed, Social Media is viral
• Earthquake impact has been significant.
Scenario Activity 2
Scenario Activity 2 Questions
5 minutes to determine action, 15 minutes group 
discussion
1. What and How did you receive the official product?
2. What is the alert level?
3. What is the expected time of arrival of the tsunami?
4. What, to Who, How and When are you going to 
communicate.
Tsunami Warning Focal Point respond as Tsunami 
Warning Focal Point, USCG as USCG others as a social 
influencer
• It is 11:55 PM
• PTWC message #3 is issued
• Media reports the tsunami is inundating the U.S. Virgin 
Islands and Puerto Rico.
• Media reports people flocking to beaches to watch the 
arrival of the tsunami.  This is causing coastal evacuation 
problems.
Scenario Activity 3
Scenario Activity 3 Questions
5 minutes for action, 15 minutes group discussion 
1. What important new information does the message 
include?  
2. What, to Who, How and When are you going to 
communicate.
Tsunami Warning Focal Point respond as 
Tsunami Warning Focal Point, USCG as 
USCG, others as a social influencer
• It is 0225 AM
• PTWC message #8 is issued
• Media reports the tsunami has inundated Puerto 
Rico coasts.
• People are wanting to enter to the evacuated areas.
Scenario Activity 4
Scenario Activity 4 Questions
5 minutes for action, 5 minutes group discussion
D‐6
1. What important new information does the message 
include?
2. What, to Who, How and When are you going to 
communicate.
Tsunami Warning Focal Point respond as Tsunami 
Warning Focal Point, USCG as USCG, others as a social 
influencers/assume agency role
• PR Governor press conference at 7 AM 
• Initial report of the event and its effects. 
• Informs that EM Officials are in field doing the 
corresponding evaluations and will be issuing the all 
clear in a further intervention. 
• Curfew for other citizens
Scenario Activity 5
Scenario Activity 5 Questions
10 minutes for group discussion
1. What is the government guidance?
2. What are additional information sources?
3. What, to Who, How and When are you going to 
communicate.
4. What will be the roles in response?
Everyone assumes agency role
Summary
• Discussed the impact of a local tsunami to at-risk tsunami 
communities along the coast.
• Examined the types of Tsunami Warning Center messages in 
the scenario
• Considered type, timing, audience and mechanism for 
communications
Hurricane Exercise






• Provide an opportunity to familiarize with the 
NOAA National Weather Service and NOAA 
National Hurricane Center products during 
the preparation, response and recovery phase 
from a major hurricane that impacted Puerto 
Rico. 
• Explain Hurricane Threats based on the 
reasonable worst-case scenario using plain 
language.
• Understand the time in which individuals can 








What should be considered when interpreting the 
Potential Tropical Cyclone Forecasts?
• It is issued only for systems threatening land within the 
watch/warning time period. 
• Earlier NHC advisories for systems that pose a long-range threat to 
the United States, or other land areas. 
• Forecasts are likely to have greater uncertainty! 
Model Guidance forecast track (Internal)




What storm surge product should be used for 
planning purpose?
• MOMs- Maximum of MEOWs 
– Used in planning to design evacuation zones and operationally 
when uncertainty is high
• MEOWs - Maximum Envelope of Water







What are the typical NHC track errors?
• Average NHC track errors increase by about 35 to 40 nautical miles per day.
– 2-day error ~ 75 n mi                                   - 3-day error ~ 110 n mi
– 4- day error ~ 160 n mi                                - 5-day error ~ 220 n mi 
Module 2: Close to Landfall
How can you determine 
when will preparation 
should be rushed to 
finished based on the 
arrival of tropical storm 
force winds? 
• Earliest Time of Arrival 
Graphic
– Time in which 
individuals can 
safely assume that 




Module 2: Close to Landfall
What information provide 
the Most Likely Time of 
Arrival Graphic? 
• Messaging Concept:
– The expected, or 
most-likely time for 
the onset of 
tropical-storm 
force winds.
– Individuals may 
have this much 
time, but shouldn’t 
plan on it.
Module 2: Close to Landfall
What is the difference between a hurricane watch 
and a warning? 
• A warning means that hurricane conditions are expected whereas a watch means 
that conditions are possible.
– A Hurricane Watch means that hurricane conditions (sustained winds of 74 
mph or higher) are possible within the specified area. A hurricane watch is 
issued 48 hours in advance of the anticipated onset of tropical-storm-force 
winds in an area.
– Hurricane warnings indicate that hurricane conditions (sustained winds of 
74 mph or higher) are expected somewhere within the specified area. The 
hurricane warning is issued 36 hours in advance of the anticipated onset of 
tropical-storm-force winds to allow for important preparation.

Module 2: Close to Landfall
Which product provide a good 
overview of the overall tropical 
impacts situation?
• Hurricane Local Statement (HLS):
– Good overview of the overall 
tropical situation in a given CWA
– Provides a summary of the worst 
impacts to plan for with areal 
descriptions
What It Does Not Represent.
• It contains no specific meteorological 
or threat information
• It is not detailed for decision makers
Header 
New Information
National Weather Service San Juan
Potential Impacts
National Weather Service San Juan
Potential Impacts
National Weather Service San Juan
Precautionary 
Statements
National Weather Service San Juan





Provide the reasonable worst case
scenario, taking into account the forecast
magnitude of the hazard, along with the
associated uncertainty of the forecast.
Grids are available at:
• http://digital.weather.gov/
Hurricane Threat and Impacts
Module 3: Landfall
When is issued an Extreme Wind 
Warning (EWW)?
• It is only issued in association with 
major hurricanes.
• The criteria for an EWW is sustained 
surface winds of 115 mph or greater.
• The EWW is intended to alert the 
public to prepare for potentially life-
threatening conditions.
Extreme Wind Warning
★ Major Hurricane Irma (Category 5)
★ Three (3) warnings were issued by      
WFO San Juan
★ September 6, 2017

Module 3: After landfall 
Which is the difference between a Flash Flood 
Warning and a Flash Flood Emergency?
• A Flash Flood Warning is issued to inform that flash flooding is in progress, imminent, or 
highly likely. Flash Flood Warnings are urgent messages as dangerous flooding can develop 
very rapidly, with a serious threat to life and/or property.
• A Flash Flood Emergency is an exceptionally rare life-threatening situation.
–Total failure of a major dam.
–Multiple swift water rescue teams have been or are being deployed in response to flash flooding 
of an exceptional magnitude.
–Water has rapidly risen or will rapidly rise to levels where people who are ordinarily in safe 
locations during previous flash flood events are now placed in life-threatening situations.
Module 4: Post-Storm
After warning and watches expired, what products are issued? 
WFO-SJU returns to normal 
operations. Any weather hazard 
is then treated on a case by case 
scenario. 
For example: 
• Flash Flood Warning
• Coastal Flood Warning
• Severe Thunderstorm Warning
• Special Weather Statements
• Hazard Weather Outlook
If required, WFO-SJU will 
provide IDSS briefing in order to 





ACTIVITY #1: Preparation  
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the Tropical 
Cyclone Formation Chance to regional EMs.
1) Based on the latest Tropical Weather Outlook (TWO),
a) Which is the formation chance through 48 hours?
b) Which is the formation chance through 5 days?
1) What represents the hatched area? 
In addition, they asked you about:
1) Which is the difference between a Tropical Storm Watch and a Tropical Storm 
Warning?
1) Which is the difference between a Hurricane Watch and a Hurricane Warning?
ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and Threats-
TC Watches and Warnings in effect 
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the earliest 
time of arrival as well as the most likely time of arrival to regional EMs. 










SCENARIO OUTLINE - Imminent
SCENARIO OUTLINE - Imminent
ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and Threats-
TC Watches and Warnings in effect 
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the following 
information to regional EMs. 
1) Based on the latest Hurricane Local Statement (HLS)
a) Which are the current Watches and Warnings?
b) Which are the Potential Impacts?
c) When will be the next forecast update?
ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and Threats-
TC Watches and Warnings in effect 
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the following 
information to regional EMs. Now you are focused over southeast Puerto Rico.
1) Based on the latest Tropical Cyclone Watch/Warning (TCV) 





ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and Threats-
TC Watches and Warnings in effect 
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the following 
information to regional EMs. Now you are focused over San Juan and Vicinity.
1) Based on the latest Tropical Cyclone Watch/Warning (TCV) 





ACTIVITY #2: Preparation and Threats-
TC Watches and Warnings in effect 
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to provide the following 
information to regional EMs. Now you are focused over Saint Croix.
1) Based on the latest Tropical Cyclone Watch/Warning (TCV), provide the following 
information
a) Timing for tropical storm force winds
b) Timing for hurricane force winds
c) Peak wind and gust
d) Equivalent Category 
Tweet posted by a Social Media Influencer
ACTIVITY #3: Risk Communication
You as EM wants to communicate threats and impacts using social media.  
1) Provide an example of a social media post, including #hashtags to communicate 
threats and impacts.
You as EM wants to clarify which are the official forecast sources.    
1) Provide an example of a social media post in order to identify the official forecast 
sources. 

ACTIVITY #4: Ongoing Threats-
TC Watches and Warnings in effect 
Assume that you represent the state EM Bureau and you need to clarify the following 
information to regional EMs.  
1) Which is the difference between a Flash Flood Warning and a Flash Flood 
Emergency?
1) What means an Extreme Wind Warning? 







Appendix F: Conclusions and Outcomes Notes 
Challenge Category Identified Response Challenge Explanation/Description Lessons Learned Improvement(s) (Actionable Tasks)









Ability to communicate with small 
communities
Lacked proper terminology to 
inform community
Post emergency 
communication needs to be 
simple and tailored to 
community (municipalities)
1. Use of short wave radios (response), SAT internet, power 
(generators).
2. Be aware of languge and culture needs. Develop focus 
groups to identify effective language/terminology, science 
communication training for personnel in agencies.  3. 
Outreach before events, such as posting informational flyers. 
Take information to community, and ask for feedback on 
material. Ask which sources of social media are most widely 
used, investigate which apps are applicable to community 
and use contact point to distribute information. 4. Identify  
centralized information in public location. Map communities 
& identify liaisons (e.g., community leaders). 5. Verify the 
community leaders, and conduct pre-training at the 
community level. Pick central location(s)/focal point to 
distribute information and time for briefing. 6. Maintain a 
database of community needs based on geography, 
demographics, resiliency center possibilities, existing 
infrastructure
Same for both:
Island wide for both (Pre emergency), evacuation 
communication, inland vs coastal impacts different 
(Post)
What to do/where should people go if 
the community is isolated and unable 
to access information after a disaster.
(e.g., school, churches, plaza)
1. Determine equipment compatibility and 
necessities for each community/region. 2. 
Conduct community workshops with 
community leaders and focus on rural and 
underserved communities. Re-identify  local 
responders willing to be translators. 3. 
Evaluate/find existing data (private and 
public), (identify orgs already doing work in 
community)  4.  Visit communities to 
document needs and points of contact.  Be 
targeted (e.g., agencies and groups 
developing message, can plan events such as 
town hall meetings) and opportunistic (e.g., if 
community is having an event, use the event 
to share information). Use an event organized 
by the community (especially with food and 
activities)
3
State level, NGOs, local emergency 
management organizations, faith-based 
orgs, schools & universities.





(e.g., mayor, elected political officials); 
grassroots community organizations (e.g., 
churches).  Official message developers 
(e.g., NWS, FEMA, local emergency 
management- PREMA, VITEMA). Sea Grant
Communities relying on social 
media and not official sources of 
information
Lack of exposure for official 
sources, too much exposure 
for other information
More outreach about what 
official sources of information 
are
1. Ensure local agencies have unified message before events. 
Conduct community outreach on official sources of 
information, who and how to access official information. 2. 
Encourage local government support of NWS, teach how the 
products published by NWS can be interpreted and how to 
use them.  Before each hurricane season, NWS sit down with 
forecast communicators, consider the use of a certificate to 
authenticate sources. 3. Teach resource quality.  4. Create 
official website/social media to document official emergency 
sources and promote/market the platform (have links back to 
each resource e.g., NWS). 5. Need to ensure power for and 
use of: SAT phones, UHF, PA systems, and encourage using 
phones with low wattage, solar hard drives. 
Education/outreach campaign on how to use the different 
technologies/pay for services 
Same for both:
increase use of tsunami ready guidelines, clarify 
tsunami warning 'cancellation' vs. 'all clear', WEA 
Invest and investigate in technologies;  
government cannot fund all of it (seek 
outside grants/funding sources)
TV personalities vs NWS (creation of 
controversy for views), NWS is less 
entertaining and has to follow 
protocols vs beliefs.  Invite celebrities 
and influencers to social media 
trainings
1. Training and education for community 
members, identify who is capable of 
conducting education sessions. At the 
outreach events, teach how to buy, use, and 
maintain the equipment. Use universities for 
outside assistance.
2. Develop an outreach team to include: 
graphic artist, website builder, science 
communication expert, marketing specialist, 
social media expert. Messaging should be 
concise, easy to read, contain critical 
information at the forefront. Use graphics 
(avoid large files), lists, various colors and 
fonts, and simple language (accommodating 
cultural preferences e.g., English vs. Spanish).
3. Be targeted (e.g., agencies and groups 
developing message, can plan events such as 
town hall) and opportunistic (e.g., if 
community is having an event, use the event 
to share information). Use an event organized 
by the community 
3
State level (PREMA & VITEMA), academia or 
other private partners, local level, 
communities/municipalities leadership (e.g., 
mayor, elected political officials); grassroots 
community organizations (e.g., churches).  
Official message developers (e.g., NWS, 
FEMA, local emergency management- 
PREMA, VITEMA). Sea Grant
Contingency planning for 
emergency communication Back up communication 
routes, diverse ways to 
request help (e.g., internet 
not available)
Need more than standard 
communication (e.g., radio, 
paper map, ham radio)
1. Encourage folks to get amateur/ham radio license. 2. 
Preposition sat phones, work with technology companies to 
develop low tech solutions 3. Conduct training/drills to teach 
community and make sure technology is working useful for both situations
encourage regular drills, practices to 
maintain capabilities
Connect with university/radio clubs.  Identify 
funding source/opportunities. 
Demonstrations to solicit interest, go to 
events and set up table.  Stories/outreach 
about why some communities were better off 
post disaster because had sat phones/ham. 
Continuing education, training
 5 (technical 
skills and need 
buy in, might still 
be problem with 
sat phone in PR)
Federal communications commission (FCC), 
ARRL - amateur radio relay league, 
emergency management agency, amateur 
radio clubs, local technical university (e.g., 
electrical engineering)
Communicate the severity 
danger/risk having public understand the 
risk; people think they are 
lucky, manage expectations, 
warning fatigue.  "Burn out"- 
desensitizing of alarms
Because of the size of the 
island, confidence in the 
forecast/warning; people get 
desensitized with many 
hurricanes missing Puerto 
Rico; so many warnings with 
nothing happening, people 
choose not to respond.  Take 
culture into account when 
designing communication 
lines
1. Show damage from previous storms, and consistent 
messaging each season. 2. Less emotion when messaging, 
keep message calm to prepare rather than scare community Same for both
Create traveling exhibit of how things went 
wrong and why you should be prepared; vivid, 
be targeted and opportunistic. Creating 
videos/photo show
2.5 Communities/municipalities leaderships 
(e.g., mayor, elected political officials); 
grassroots community organizations (e.g., 
churches).  Official message developers 
(e.g., NWS, FEMA, local emergency 
management- PREMA, VITEMA). Sea Grant
Communication
Challenge Category Identified Response Challenge Explanation/Description Lessons Learned Improvement(s) (Actionable Tasks)









Lack/enforcement of residential 
building codes
building codes not enforced, 
and people did not 
understand homes were 
unsafe
More damage and loss of life 
due to unsafe structures
1. Messaging related to maintaining a safe structure, not
exclusively collecting water. 2. Critical infrastructure should 
be evaluated 3. Properly use federal funds to repair and 
maintain infrastructure 4. Professional education, 
assessment of curriculum in all academic settings Same for both dept. of transportation
Detailed assessment of critical infrastructure; 
meeting with engineers/architects in 
municipalities to go around communities to 
identify most important aspect of a structure. 
Different source of funding for public, private 
and municipal 
5
Municipal architects/engineers; FEMA 
capacity build sector; 
Access to clean water
no redundant water for 
residents/no cisterns People ran out of water
1. Education on rainwater harvesting, the importance of it.
Community workshops on virus protection fitting into 
cultural norms (list of best practices)  2. Improve residential 
water collection to maintain a reserve. Encourage rainwater 
collection/capture with safe treatment. 3. Education on low 
cost filters (e.g., sand). 4. Education on maintenance of 
individual water sources. Reduce barriers to 
home/commercial rainwater capturing. 5. Proper installation 
of tanks/cisterns. 6. Promote/fix policy for rainwater capture. 
7. Investigate/ revise rainwater capture policy (resiliency
center example).
Same for both
1. Educate on proper use of water catchment
filtration systems. Educating about how to 
clean water/maintain system 2.  Create 
document (e.g., one-pager)/demonstration 
for rainwater harvesting; low cost, implement 
at a few locations within the community to 
encourage community members to copy. 3. 
Create tax incentives to make 
collection/filtration more widespread. 4. New 
construction require redundant water 
systems, existing construction improve 
collection systems,
Education = 2                           
Implementation 
= 3






Homeowner association, private industry, 
engineering organizations, academia, 
government, SME (Small Medium 
Enterprise) incubators
local water company, non-profits, private 
business, 
commonwealth/territory/municipality 
responsible for building codes
Poorly maintained infrastructure e.g., failure of infrastructure
(water); waiting for govt to 
maintain infrastructure




Enforce construction code, certified inspectors, education for 
empowerment in maintenance solidarity training. 1. Informal 
contractor training 2. Use best construction/maintenance 
practices from other hurricane/ prone states and countries 
coastal vs island wide (different types but similar 
problem)
benefit for local may have regional 
impacts
Create courses and certifications, mandate 
training. Build cat 4&5 rated buildings and 
implement best practices for Tsunami 
resilience
4
Government and engineering organizations, 
insurance industries, community 
involvement/participation
Leadership
Leadership and capacity for 
multiple, simultaneous disasters
Competition for resources. 
Trained/experienced 
resources. Turnover of 
political/experienced/burnout 
staff.  Don't restructure the 
organization during a disaster 
Climate change could lead to 
stressors to 
staff/resources/retention. 
Need local level leaders- 
educated through trainings. 
Minimize turnover. 
Professionalize emergency management positions, 
establish/increase emergency management schools, local 
level leader training. 1. Develop curriculum from vocational 
schools to higher learning institutions
Same for both 1. Curriculum development (at all levels)
3
Academia & dept. of education
Port accessibility limited because of 
law San Juan is major port for 
food/resources coming to PR. 
Other ports are used for 
petroleum products, coal.  
necessary aid could not be 
distributed/get to local 
communities quick enough. 
Circumvent barriers using 
emergency declaration to 
streamline that (e.g., turn off 
taxation during response.)
1. Landside facilities are geared toward handling only one
type of commodity, 2. Require private ports to be capable, 
and ready to act in the case of a disaster. 3. Identify alternate 
airports/transportation that would be viable in event of 
storm 4. Identify laws impeding maritime supplies, and push 
for them to be temporarily waived (e.g., Jones Act) for 
appropriate timeframe. 5. Neutral study on Puerto Rico 
relevant Jones Act Issues related to emergency support
Same for both The process is there but political 
realities impede use. Major airport is 
in splash zone for tsunami. Potential 
to stage resources
1. conduct study and analyze potential
impacts of change
2. Have diverse ports, capable of handling
other goods; back-up port for response 
operations. 3. Policy shift by port authority by 
diversifying use of port. 4. Update 
contingency plans to have more than one 
viable port available. 
Study =1
 Change = 5
Academia, think-tank
port authority, govt of PR, private industry
Marine/land debris hindered by 
lack of staging areas and logistics see Florida plans for an 
example
need pre-identified staging 
areas
1. Having a plan for where to put marine debris, 2. destroyed
buildings/construction materials, 3. Identify final location for 
debris (e.g., landfill vs. taking off island) Same for both see x-prize winner
1. Identifying locations ahead of time in
contingency plans, 2. Encourage use of 
central drop-off locations for community 
members to dispose of household hazardous 
waste (HHW)
1.5-2
FEMA, USCG, local agencies, NOAA Marine 
Debris, Public Works, EPA
Land Use Plan building again in high-hazard 
area (i.e., schools, hospital, 
NWS)
we must enforce sensible use 
of land use plan and zoning; 
assess on paper but in reality 
is different (i.e., zoning)
1. Enforce code, consistency in code, implement new code. 2.
Approve new land use regulations with strong focus on risk 
zones.
Same for both 1. Meet with risk experts and planning board
to ensure best practices  
4
local and state gov., (Permitting agencies, 
municipalities), community feedback
Policy guidelines (*PAPPG) need to 
be revisited due to change and new 
technology, climate change etc. 
Better integrate green 
technologies, climate change 
considerations into existing 
policies for funding and 
mitigation.
These policies need to be 
revised before an incident
High-level policy agreement on existing FEMA public 
assistance, mitigation and recovery policies. Maintain and 
restore corals and natural infrastructure to protect coastal 
communities. Simplify FEMA’s public assistance program 
policies for non-traditional natural features Same for both
Coasts on island are particularly 
important. 
GAO-focus group. Agency feedback to GAO 
and FEMA. Agencies/academia provide 
information on how green infrastructure fits 
into FEMA facilities. 
4




Challenge Category Identified Response Challenge Explanation/Description Lessons Learned Improvement(s) (Actionable Tasks)









OFAs (other federal agencies) need 
to be assertive in their 
supplemental funding request
There are some things FEMA 
can not fund You snooze, you lose
Use consistent vocabulary. Agencies should be 
responsible/aware for their own coverage/vocabulary. Host 
workshops/training on funding/grant 
writing/petitions/procurement/opportunities. Include the 
local emergency coordinators along with the state and 
mayors at annual meeting  for training (not limited to local 
authority).Training of federal grant submission 
(preparedness).Improve liaison outreach/communication. Same for both This might be unique to Puerto Rico.
Interagency training on procedures of funding 
opportunities. Create a survey (to 
commonwealth agencies) to gather post-
event lessons learned on supplemental grant 
processes. Federal agencies aware of 
supplemental funding opportunities (grant, 
special project funding) and responsible for 
requests relative to their mandates.  Federal 
agencies should be prepared with requests to 
Congress for supplemental funding according 
to their agency mandates.
3
federal agencies. Commonwealth is unique 
in that funding budget does not allow for 
Interpersonnel- layers of 
bureaucracy slowed progress
 politics getting in the way of 
progress
need to identify an authority- 
in past only identified 
problem
1. Create checklist to identify tasks for each person, 2. 
communicate/socialize checklist and responsibilities, 3. hold 
organizations accountable for responsibilities, 4. share 
information with managers Same for both
People need to know their jobs (checklist), 
communication to avoid different decisions 
being made, held accountable by making sure 
people report problems (investigation),  
teams of public oversight to help. This might 
not help everyone but it could in the future. 
Turn over the information to theirs and new 
leaders (who has that information for when 
you are gone?)
4
all levels (state municipalities) 
People inadequately prepared for 
cat. 4 or 5, tsunamis (high impact, 
low frequency events)
Prior close calls gave a false 
sense of security & resources 
were moved to VI to deal with 
Irma
Should prepare regardless of 
category level
For Hurricane : 1. Involve social scientists, they may be able 
to help with effective, engaged outreach. 2. Education and 
buy-in from local community leaders. More effective 
exercises especially on the items we did wrong previously 
(i.e., AAR). Use Hurricane Maria as an example and spread 
lessons learned. Don't let AAR sit on a shelf; reassess. 
Develop a checklist of activities. 3. Contingency planning to 
include multiple back-up NWS offices outside of threat zone
For Tsunami:   prepare models and videos of what it would 
look like (overlay culturally significant places), storm surge 
water marks / signage (Keep reminders of physical damage), 
Art projects. Media and education campaign
Both
Tsunami = preparing for something you haven't 
experienced, increased challenge -
ex. In US Storm Ready in Florida has 3 
counties, in Puerto Rico there are 78 
municipalities under 1 person.
Social science (this is not a technical problem) 
how we can improve transfer of information. 
Research the effectiveness of 
training/translation. Implement NWS  Storm 
Ready. Expand CERT to include specific 
training to community (i.e., storm surge, 
flood). Conduct multi-district/municipality 
exercises.
community involved: award competitions for 
campaign, education outreach all ages 
involved. Conduct for both hurricane and 





Challenge Category Identified Response Challenge Explanation/Description Lessons Learned Improvement(s) (Actionable Tasks)









Lack of emergency planning
Starting from family, 
community, local, regional. 
Local level preparedness plan 
created with central point of 
information.  Need 
accountability w.r.t. response 
plans.  Pre-emergency 
planning to include local law 
enforcement and impartial 
parties (e.g., NGO, faith based 
organizations)
1. Aggressive on pre plan: (a) what programs already have a 
plan in place? (b) create plans for schools, daycare, work, 
etc., (c) work with existing organizations or program 
infrastructure/community leaders. 2. Educate the community 
regarding: (a) necessary supplies, (b) what should they do 
with supplies, (c) have it ready before the event- bag of 
supplies, food, water, communication tools, etc.), 3. Conduct 
community training/perform drills/table top exercises. 4. Use 
table top exercises to improve plan/make changes.  5. Re-
institute CERT program in schools, churches, etc. and use in 
coordination with neighborhood watch programs (e.g., "next-
door" type app). 6. Consider worst case scenarios (e.g., 
downed communications, limited tools available)
Both
Some - hurricane gives family level planning, 
Tsunami = "save self mindset", 
more focus on the lower levels 
(families, communities, etc.)  
( )  p     
knowledge for the local leaders to bring back 
to their communities (ex. kids can take it 
home to their families), break up the 
workshops into regions to allow more people 
to attend (for different cultures), NOAA office 
for coastal management.  See VITEMA model 
as a starting point. (2) Outreach- media blitz 
(ads at the movies, on roads, radios, TV 
stations, at stores), public and private classes 
(home improvement stores), youth 
organizations (boy scouts, girl scouts, etc.),  
these need to be on how to prepare for these 
events. Use project based learning platforms, 
find and edit existing checklists than can be 
relevant to Puerto Rico and distribute to 
community members.  Create emergency 
management education program for 
communities at all levels year-round. Using 
existing avenues/organized community 
events to demonstrate how to use a map, 
why it is important to have freshwater, etc. 
(3) Goal is to create self-sufficient 
communities.  Put people on the ground in 
pilot communities (more difficult to 
implement but more results), share the 
results! (4) Update contingency plans to 
include equipment pre-stage locations
3
community levels (school system, 
community members), NGOs, Universities, 
media outlets, photo journalist workshops, 
emergency management agencies, FEMA
Lack of federal Pre-Scripted 
Mission Assignments (PSMA)  
Minimize duplicity of efforts. 
The more prescripted mission 
assignments, the quicker 
response activities can 
commence and provides 
training opportunities within 
agencies
1. Review of existing and development of PSMAs. Integrate 
commonwealth and FEMA prescripted efforts prior to 
disaster. 2. Conduct more outreach with state/territory/govt 
level to educate about what they can ask for in terms of 
mission assignments. 3. Automated PSMAs for approval, 
signatures. 4. Include mission assignments in training and 
exercises. 5. Review historical lessons learned to drive future 
assessments Same for both
1. Agencies review what they have currently. 
2. Agencies develop new ones as appropriate 
(e.g., funding for and using NOAA SSC's during 
non-pollution, weather-related deployments). 
3. Keep hazard mitigation plan up to date. 4. 
Educate commonwealth about FEMA 
missions to determine what can be asked for.  
FEMA relies on guidance from local govt level. 
5. Conduct exercises to review and update 
PSMAs. Develop checklist for the state to use 
to make requests. Recommend to GAO? 6. 
Inform what can be asked for (e.g., guidance 
document/ lessons learned)
4 Federal Agencies (FEMA), state and local 
emergency management agencies (e.g., 
coastal agencies, all encompassing plan), 
port authorities, schools, local chamber of 
commerce, private businesses. 
Commonwealth/local govt (e.g., hazard 
mitigation office), 
Did not pre-emptively involve 
private sector
Private sector often has 
resources it can contribute to 
response effort-  have 
resources and assets 
connected at all levels.
Involve private sector during 
contingency plans.  Make the 




1. Getting to conversation early. 2. Potential for new 
contracts/prepositioning equipment ahead of time. Same for both
Multiple companies get hired or one primary 
contractor with sub-contractors. Advanced 
contracting initiatives for pre-planned 
contracts. List for potential companies 
available if needed pre-,during, post- disaster
sliding scale
private businesses, local govt, contractors
Response
Rapid assessments of 
damage/debris were critical. Be 
bold on initial assessment. 
Baseline for FEMA to consider 
funding opportunities. 
Areas/communities that had 
quick assessments made it 
easier to scope federal 
funding
1. Establish baseline prior to event for municipalities; 2. 
Centralized application to collect assessment information for 
multiple sectors (i.e., communication center); 3. Pre-plan for 
what we need to do (before and after),   include lag time for 
response operations (why preparedness is so important), be 
able to grow food, apply for grants to build-in redundant 
funding; 4. The public can report on their municipalities both
This goes beyond just FEMA. Post and 
report storm information i.e., 
#hurricane Maria (include GPS). Post -
Tsunami survey guide is available. 
Language and culture must be taken 
into consideration.
1. Assessments, inventory, create culture;  
2.Implement #hashtag. Field exercise like 
CARIBEWAVE. Develop app (see SERT-FL).
3.5
Communities, municipalities, state and , 




were stuck in place
don't wait until hospital is 
impacted to make 
decisions/hospital need 
redundant or back up energy 
sources
1. Census data/demographic data to focus efforts and 
identified during emergency preparedness planning to create 
a special needs plan (i.e., assess who is at risk in each 
town/region). 2. Compliance checks done in low income 
communities, first. 3. Recommendations for improvements 
rather than fines. 4. Messages tailored to underserved 
communities. Evacuation plan may vary between T and H
Time of day may influence who is 
present in the community, family plan 
would identify who is available during 
the day vs. night.
If municipalities emergency contingency plans 
don't exist, then develop and identify 
vulnerable population(s).  If they do exist, 
include in them. Prioritize installation of 100 
Watt radios in hospitals, police stations, EMS 
communication centers, OEM offices around 
the island
4 census bureau, social services, health and 
human services, local law enforcement, 
local emergency response management, 
planning and development agency
Preparedness
